From self-recognition to theory of mind

1994 ◽  
pp. 51-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
György Gergely
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Self Recognition

What can we learn from the absence of evidence?

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Zentall
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Absence Of Evidence

Heyes discounts findings of imitation and self recognition in nonhuman primates based on flimsy speculation and then indicates that even positive findings would not provide evidence of theory of mind. Her proposed experiment is unlikely to work, however, because, even if the animals have a theory of mind, a number of assumptions, not directly related to theory of mind, must be made about their reasoning ability.

Imitation and mirror self-recognition may be developmental precursors to theory of mind in human and nonhuman primates

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim A. Bard
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Self Recognition

Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate, recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective, and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind. First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities are necessary precursors in the development of theory of mind.

scholarly journals Theory of mind in nonhuman primates

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. Heyes
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Primate Behavior ◽  
Conditional Discrimination Training ◽  
Role Taking ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Substantial Progress

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.

Liberalism, chauvinism, and experimental thought

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 134-148
Author(s):  
C. M. Heyes
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Research Methods ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Cast Doubt

The target article argued that there is currently no reliable evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman primates and proposed research methods for future use in this field. Some commentators judged the research proposals to be too chauvinist (in danger of falsely denying that primates attribute mental states), but a majority judged them to be too liberal (in danger of falsely affirming theory of mind in primates). The most valuable comments from both camps exemplified “experimental thought,” the obverse of “thought experiments,” and recommended specific alterations and alternatives to the studies I proposed. This Response evaluates these recommendations and presents a revised version of the proposals that appear in the target article. Other valuable commentary cast doubt on the assumption that people have a theory of mind, aired the possibility that language may be a prerequisite for either possession or detection of a theory of mind, questioned the notion of critical experiments, and emphasized the distinction between attribution of sight and belief. In addition to commenting on these issues, I respond to objections to my interpretation of existing research on self-recognition, imitation, and deception.

scholarly journals Three Levels of Consciousness: A Pattern in Phylogeny and Human Ontogeny

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beat Wechsler
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Time Travel ◽  
Mental Time Travel ◽  
Behavioral Organization ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Behavioral Rules ◽  
Animal Welfare Science ◽  
Recognition Theory ◽  
Human Ontogeny

Investigations in the cognitive abilities of different animal species and children at different ages have revealed that consciousness comes in degrees. In this review, I will first address four cognitive abilities that are important to discriminate levels of consciousness: mirror self-recognition, theory of mind, mental time travel, and the capacity to entertain secondary representations. I will then examine putative relations between these abilities and assign them to three levels of consciousness (anoetic, noetic, autonoetic). Finally, I will discuss the implications of differences in consciousness for the understanding of behavioral organization in animals and humans and for animal welfare science. I will argue that, on one hand, implicit behavioral rules may account for results obtained in research on theory of mind and mental time travel abilities in animals and children. On the other hand, secondary representations may be the key to explain behaviors based on semantic memory as well as semantic future planning abilities observed in great apes and young children. These considerations are in accordance with the view that an explicit theory of mind and a continuous self through time are unique to humans.

scholarly journals Primate theory of mind is a Turing test

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Mitchell ◽  
James R. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Self Recognition

Heyes's literature review of deception, imitation, and self-recognition is inadequate, misleading, and erroneous. The anaesthetic artifact hypothesis of self-recognition is unsupported by the data she herself examines. Her proposed experiment is tantalizing, indicating that theory of mind is simply a Turing test.

Cognitive gadgets: A provocative but flawed manifesto

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Del Giudice
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Twin Studies ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Evolutionary Approach ◽  
Genetic Inheritance ◽  
Double Standards ◽  
Cross Cultural Differences ◽  
Cherry Picking ◽  
Dichotomous Thinking

Abstract The argument against innatism at the heart of Cognitive Gadgets is provocative but premature, and is vitiated by dichotomous thinking, interpretive double standards, and evidence cherry-picking. I illustrate my criticism by addressing the heritability of imitation and mindreading, the relevance of twin studies, and the meaning of cross-cultural differences in theory of mind development. Reaching an integrative understanding of genetic inheritance, plasticity, and learning is a formidable task that demands a more nuanced evolutionary approach.

Are Deficits in Social Cognition Linked to Autobiographical Memory in Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease?

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 257-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes H. Scheidemann ◽  
Franz Petermann ◽  
Marc Schipper
Keyword(s):  
Alzheimer’S Disease ◽  
Alzheimer's Disease ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Autobiographical Memory ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Neuropsychological Test ◽  
Clinical Group ◽  
Neuropsychological Test Battery ◽  
Fluency Task

Abstract. We investigated theory of mind (ToM) deficits in Alzheimer‘s disease (AD) and its possible connection to autobiographical memory (ABM). Patients and matched controls were evaluated and compared using a video-based ToM test, an autobiographical fluency task, and a neuropsychological test battery. We found that ToM deficits were positively associated with semantic ABM in the clinical group, whereas a positive relationship appeared between ToM and episodic ABM in controls. We hypothesize that this reflects the course of the disease as well as that semantic ABM is used for ToM processing, being still accessible in AD. Furthermore, we assume that it is also less efficient, which in turn leads to a specific deficit profile of social cognition.

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