Differentiating between self and others: an ALE meta-analysis of fMRI studies of self-recognition and theory of mind

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne J. van Veluw ◽  
Steven A. Chance
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Emre Bora

Abstract Background It is widely accepted that borderline personality disorder (BPD) is associated with significant impairments in mentalization and theory of mind (ToM) which are considered as closely related concepts by many authors particularly in psychoanalytical circles. However, for understanding interpersonal difficulties in personality disorders, it is important to distinguish neuro-social cognitive impairment from the abnormal meta-social-cognitive style of patients. Methods The current systematic review aimed to conduct separate meta-analyses of ‘mentalization’ [reflective functioning (RF] and different aspects of ToM in BPD. A literature search was conducted to locate relevant articles published between January 1990 to July 2021. Random-effect meta-analyses were conducted in 34 studies involving 1448 individuals with BPD and 2006 healthy controls. Results A very large impairment in RF was evident in BPD [d = 1.68, confidence interval (CI) = 1.17–2.19]. In contrast, ToM impairment was modest (d = 0.36, CI = 0.24–0.48). BPD patients underperformed healthy controls in ToM-reasoning (d = 0.44, CI = 0.32–0.56) but not ToM-decoding. Increased HyperToM (d = 0.60, CI = 0.41–0.79) and faux pas recognition (d = 0.62, CI = 0.35–0.90) errors in BPD compared to healthy controls were most robust ToM findings in this meta-analysis. Conclusions BPD is characterized by very severe deficits in RF and modest and selective abnormalities in ToM. Interpersonal problems and difficulties in processing social information in BPD can be best explained by patients' maldaptive meta-social cognitive style and top-down effects of these abnormalities rather than having a primary neuro-social cognitive deficit.


1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Zentall

Heyes discounts findings of imitation and self recognition in nonhuman primates based on flimsy speculation and then indicates that even positive findings would not provide evidence of theory of mind. Her proposed experiment is unlikely to work, however, because, even if the animals have a theory of mind, a number of assumptions, not directly related to theory of mind, must be made about their reasoning ability.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
XiaoGuang Lin ◽  
XueLing Zhang ◽  
QinQin Liu ◽  
PanWen Zhao ◽  
JianGuo Zhong ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. 118-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Élisabeth Thibaudeau ◽  
Amélie M. Achim ◽  
Carolane Parent ◽  
Mélissa Turcotte ◽  
Caroline Cellard
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Bora ◽  
C. Bartholomeusz ◽  
C. Pantelis

BackgroundTheory of mind (ToM) dysfunction is prominent in a number of psychiatric disorders, in particular, autism and schizophrenia, and can play a significant role in poor functioning. There is now emerging evidence suggesting that ToM abilities are also impaired in bipolar disorder (BP); however, the relationship between ToM deficits and mood state is not clear.MethodWe conducted a meta-analysis of ToM studies in BP. Thirty-four studies comparing 1214 patients with BP and 1097 healthy controls were included. BP groups included remitted (18 samples, 545 BP patients), subsyndromal (12 samples, 510 BP patients), and acute (manic and/or depressed) (10 samples, 159 BP patients) patients.ResultsToM performance was significantly impaired in BP compared to controls. This impairment was evident across different types of ToM tasks (including affective/cognitive and verbal/visual) and was also evident in strictly euthymic patients with BP (d = 0.50). There were no significant differences between remitted and subsyndromal samples. However, ToM deficit was significantly more severe during acute episodes (d = 1.23). ToM impairment was significantly associated with neurocognitive and particularly with manic symptoms.ConclusionSignificant but modest sized ToM dysfunction is evident in remitted and subsyndromal BP. Acute episodes are associated with more robust ToM deficits. Exacerbation of ToM deficits may contribute to the more significant interpersonal problems observed in patients with acute or subsyndromal manic symptoms. There is a need for longitudinal studies comparing the developmental trajectory of ToM deficits across the course of the illness.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (10) ◽  
pp. 963-977
Author(s):  
Olivia P. Demichelis ◽  
Sarah P. Coundouris ◽  
Sarah A. Grainger ◽  
Julie D. Henry

AbstractObjective:A large literature now shows that Alzheimer’s disease (AD) disrupts a number of social cognitive abilities, including social perceptual function and theory of mind (ToM). However, less well understood is how the specific subcomponents of ToM as well as both the broader and specific subcomponents of empathic processing are affected.Method:The current study provides the first meta-analytic review of AD that focuses on both empathy and ToM as broad constructs, as well as their overlapping (cognitive empathy and affective ToM) and distinct (affective empathy and cognitive ToM) subcomponents.Results:Aggregated across 31 studies, the results revealed that, relative to controls, AD is associated with large-sized deficits in both cognitive ToM (g = 1.09) and affective ToM/cognitive empathy (g = 0.76). However, no statistical differences were found between the AD participants and controls on affective empathic abilities (g = 0.36).Conclusions:These data point to a potentially important disconnect between core aspects of social cognitive processing in people with AD. The practical and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.


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