What can we learn from the absence of evidence?

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Zentall
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Absence Of Evidence

Heyes discounts findings of imitation and self recognition in nonhuman primates based on flimsy speculation and then indicates that even positive findings would not provide evidence of theory of mind. Her proposed experiment is unlikely to work, however, because, even if the animals have a theory of mind, a number of assumptions, not directly related to theory of mind, must be made about their reasoning ability.

Imitation and mirror self-recognition may be developmental precursors to theory of mind in human and nonhuman primates

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim A. Bard
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Self Recognition

Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate, recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective, and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind. First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities are necessary precursors in the development of theory of mind.

scholarly journals Theory of mind in nonhuman primates

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. Heyes
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Primate Behavior ◽  
Conditional Discrimination Training ◽  
Role Taking ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Substantial Progress

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.

Liberalism, chauvinism, and experimental thought

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 134-148
Author(s):  
C. M. Heyes
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Research Methods ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Cast Doubt

The target article argued that there is currently no reliable evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman primates and proposed research methods for future use in this field. Some commentators judged the research proposals to be too chauvinist (in danger of falsely denying that primates attribute mental states), but a majority judged them to be too liberal (in danger of falsely affirming theory of mind in primates). The most valuable comments from both camps exemplified “experimental thought,” the obverse of “thought experiments,” and recommended specific alterations and alternatives to the studies I proposed. This Response evaluates these recommendations and presents a revised version of the proposals that appear in the target article. Other valuable commentary cast doubt on the assumption that people have a theory of mind, aired the possibility that language may be a prerequisite for either possession or detection of a theory of mind, questioned the notion of critical experiments, and emphasized the distinction between attribution of sight and belief. In addition to commenting on these issues, I respond to objections to my interpretation of existing research on self-recognition, imitation, and deception.

Is There a Social Module? Language, Face Processing, and Theory of Mind in Individuals with Williams Syndrome

1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Karmiloff-Smith ◽  
Edward Klima ◽  
Ursula Bellugi ◽  
Julia Grant ◽  
Simon Baron-Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Down Syndrome ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Williams Syndrome ◽  
Face Processing ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Neurodevelopmental Disorder ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Current Thinking ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
The Brain

Many species can respond to the behavior of their conspecifics. Human children, and perhaps some nonhuman primates, also have the capacity to respond to the mental states of their conspecifics, i.e., they have a “theory of mind.” On the basis of previous research on the theory-of-mind impairment in people with autism, together with animal models of intentionality, Brothers and Ring (1992) postulated a broad cognitive module whose function is to build representations of other individuals. We evaluate the details of this hypothesis through a series of experiments on language, face processing, and theory of mind carried out with subjects with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in an uneven lin-guisticocognitive profile. The results are discussed in terms of how the comparison of different phenotypes (e.g., Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, autism, and hydrocephaly with associated myelomeningocele) can contribute both to understanding the neuropsychology of social cognition and to current thinking about the purported modularity of the brain.

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