scholarly journals Self-recognition, theory-of-mind, and self-awareness: What side are you on?

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Morin
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Recognition Theory

scholarly journals Three Levels of Consciousness: A Pattern in Phylogeny and Human Ontogeny

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beat Wechsler
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Time Travel ◽  
Mental Time Travel ◽  
Behavioral Organization ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Behavioral Rules ◽  
Animal Welfare Science ◽  
Recognition Theory ◽  
Human Ontogeny

Investigations in the cognitive abilities of different animal species and children at different ages have revealed that consciousness comes in degrees. In this review, I will first address four cognitive abilities that are important to discriminate levels of consciousness: mirror self-recognition, theory of mind, mental time travel, and the capacity to entertain secondary representations. I will then examine putative relations between these abilities and assign them to three levels of consciousness (anoetic, noetic, autonoetic). Finally, I will discuss the implications of differences in consciousness for the understanding of behavioral organization in animals and humans and for animal welfare science. I will argue that, on one hand, implicit behavioral rules may account for results obtained in research on theory of mind and mental time travel abilities in animals and children. On the other hand, secondary representations may be the key to explain behaviors based on semantic memory as well as semantic future planning abilities observed in great apes and young children. These considerations are in accordance with the view that an explicit theory of mind and a continuous self through time are unique to humans.

What can we learn from the absence of evidence?

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Zentall
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Absence Of Evidence

Heyes discounts findings of imitation and self recognition in nonhuman primates based on flimsy speculation and then indicates that even positive findings would not provide evidence of theory of mind. Her proposed experiment is unlikely to work, however, because, even if the animals have a theory of mind, a number of assumptions, not directly related to theory of mind, must be made about their reasoning ability.

scholarly journals Valuation of Morality and Mind: Morality as a Metacognitive Byproduct

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Baxter
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Preliminary Analysis ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Inanimate Object ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
High Valuation ◽  
Mental Properties

The organism has evolved to view itself as a sentient being. It is theorised that morality is a byproduct of the high valuation of mental properties (the nature of its theory of mind). Five studies were conducted with 2675 participants. A positive association was confirmed between valuation of explicit morality, neutral (general) mind as measured by sentience, and significance of (specific) mind as measured by integrity (1). The moral worth ratings of a protagonist were affected by manipulating perceived significance of mind as expressed by scope and intensity of thought (2). 50% of participants thought morality applies exclusively to creatures with minds (3). A positive association was found between the self-awareness and moral worth ratings of a variety of creatures and human characters (4). Furthermore, the moral worth ratings of a human being and `philosophical phantom' (sentient inanimate object) were greater than those of a philosophical zombie and rock (5). Like H. Gray et al. [1], this research suggests that morality is based on the belief in mind (1-5). Specifically, the results suggest that valuation of experience (sentience) and agency (significance of mind) are not independent, as assignment of morality appears preconditioned upon the perception of (or assumption of) sentience (5). Furthermore, contrary to dyadic models [2], preliminary analysis supported the prediction of self and other-directed morality (1).

scholarly journals Hermeneutical Injustice, (Self-)Recognition, and Academia

Hypatia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilkje C. Hänel
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
Women In Academia ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Recognition Theory ◽  
Radical Claim ◽  
Vocabulary Recognition

AbstractMiranda Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and remedies for this injustice are widely debated. This article adds to the existing debate by arguing that theories of recognition can fruitfully contribute to Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and can provide a framework for structural remedy. By pairing Fricker's theory of hermeneutical injustice with theories of recognition, I bring forward a modest claim and a more radical claim. The first concerns a shift in our vocabulary; recognition theory can give a name to the seriousness of the long-term effects of hermeneutical injustice. The second claim is more radical: thinking of hermeneutical injustice as preventing what I call “self-recognition” provides a structural remedy to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice. Because hermeneutical injustice is first and foremost a structural injustice, I contend that every virtue theory of hermeneutical justice should be complemented by structural remedies in terms of recognition. Finally, what I argue sheds light on the seriousness of cases of exclusion of and discrimination against women in academia and helps to draw our attention to new ways to combat such problems.

Grey wolf may show signs of self-awareness with the sniff test of self-recognition

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Roberto Cazzolla Gatti ◽  
Alena Velichevskaya ◽  
Benjamin Gottesman ◽  
Karen Davis
Keyword(s):  
Self Awareness ◽  
Grey Wolf ◽  
Self Recognition

Imitation and mirror self-recognition may be developmental precursors to theory of mind in human and nonhuman primates

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim A. Bard
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Self Recognition

Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate, recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective, and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind. First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities are necessary precursors in the development of theory of mind.

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