Integrating International Human Rights and Comparative Constitutional Law Into the U.S. Constitutional Law Course

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 357-359
Author(s):  
Mark Tushnet
1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 851-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard B. Lillich

A decade ago Professor Henkin remarked that “there has been almost no examination at all of the relation between international human rights and the American Constitutional version of human rights.” Since then he has done much to fill this gap in the literature, as has, more recently, a distinguished barrister/scholar from Great Britain. Nevertheless, it may be useful, in this symposium celebrating the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, to survey both the contribution it has made to the development of international human rights law and the extent to which the latter has influenced the evolution of U.S. constitutional law.


ICL Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-118
Author(s):  
Laura-Stella Enonchong

Abstract This article discusses the idea of international human rights law as ‘constitutional law’. It applies the French concept of Le contrôle de conventionnalité des lois, to demonstrate the constitutional potentials of international human rights law in the domestic sphere. In most monist constitutional systems based on the French civilian model, international law takes precedence over acts of parliament and other domestic legislation. Due in part to that hierarchy, conventionnalité permits the courts to review domestic law for compatibility with international law. From that perspective, international human rights norms can be said to have assumed a ‘para-constitutional’ function. Using two case studies from francophone Africa, this article argues that conventionnalité has the potential to play a significant role in the domestic implementation of international human rights and ultimately contributing to a more comprehensive domestic human rights regime.


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-163
Author(s):  
Richard B. Lillich ◽  
Hurst Hannum

While many law schools now offer separate courses or seminars on international human rights law, the number of students exposed to such specialized study remains relatively small. Human rights law is relevant to many other segments of the law school curriculum—in particular, to courses on constitutional law and individual rights—although little scholarly attention has been devoted to date to integrating appropriate human rights issues into the “bread and butter” courses that all law students take. To begin to address this lacuna, the Procedural Aspects of International Law (PAIL) Institute has undertaken to develop a human rights component or module designed to supplement leading constitutional law course books and present methods of teaching constitutional law.


Author(s):  
Crystal Parikh

The Introduction of Writing Human Rights provides a historical overview of the international and domestic postwar contexts in which an international human rights regime was established, as it distinguishes human rights from liberal humanitarianism. It focuses on Toni Morrison’s Beloved as a watershed novel for theorizing human rights at the end of the “American century.”


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 380-384
Author(s):  
Alexandra Huneeus

A topic motivating much research since 2016 is the turn away from international law caused by a surge in non-liberal and nationalist governments across the world. In the realm of human rights law, scholars have noted how states are now more apt to repudiate, resist, or simply ignore their human rights obligations. This essay makes a different cut into this topic. It considers not how non-liberal actors reject human rights law, but rather what happens when they embrace it. International human rights law in Latin America—often understood as a means of promoting a cosmopolitan, liberal political order—is also being harnessed toward other types of political projects. This raises the question of how necessary the link is between human rights and political liberalism: is non-liberal engagement an existential threat, or can human rights law have a thinner commitment to liberal principles than does, for example, national constitutional law? As the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) turns fifty, this essay argues that the human rights law of the Americas is open-ended enough that it can incorporate, and has at times incorporated, non-liberal concerns and norms without losing coherence or legitimacy. Further, this may be an apt survival strategy, albeit not the only one, for the region's human rights institutions in our time.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Rau

For want of an effective and accessible universal system for redress of international human rights abuses, victims of human rights violations increasingly seek reparations in domestic civil courts. In the United States in particular, the federal courts, since the 1980 Filártiga decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have already decided on a remarkable number of civil suits alleging human rights violations committed abroad, the most recent example of this trend being a class action of members and supporters of opposition political groups in Zimbabwe who invoke the so-called Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) against President and Foreign Minister Robert Mugabe with respect to alleged acts of torture. According to the proponents of such lawsuits, international human rights litigation in domestic civil courts can serve as an important tool in the worldwide effort to enforce international norms concerned with the protection of the individual which may complement criminal prosecutions of the offenders. As stated by Professor Stevens, who has litigated many of the international human rights cases in the U.S. federal courts, \\\“civil lawsuits for human rights violations […] serve a role similar to tort litigation in a domestic forum: to offer victims of violence a legal remedy which they control and which may satisfy needs not met by the criminal law system.\\\”


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 339-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Powell

This essay discusses how, despite the liberatory potential of technology, racial bias pervades the digital space. This bias creates tension with both the formal, de jure equality notion of “colorblindness” (in U.S. constitutional law) as well as the broader, substantive, de facto equality idea (in international human rights law). The essay draws on the work of Osagie Obasogie to show how blind people perceive race in the same way as sighted people, despite not being able to see race. It then uses blindness as a metaphor to explore how race is seen and not seen online, and analyzes the implications of this for human rights.


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