Can Biological, Toxin, and Chemical Warfare be Eliminated?

AbstractThe Chemical Weapons Convention remains a landmark international treaty. It was the first multilateral agreement to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and include a strict verification regime to monitor compliance. Scientists were not only deeply engaged in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but have been central to the life of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ever since it came into existence almost 20 years ago. Over that time, during which the OPCW focused primarily on its mission to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the organization has relied on a very committed core of scientific expertise – from within and outside – to help guide it. As that core task comes to a close, the Organization faces a new challenge: ensuring that chemical weapons do not return. Meeting that challenge will require new approaches to the OPCW’s mission.

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Unconventional Weapons

Wars of Modern Babylon ◽

10.5810/kentucky/9780813169439.003.0058 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Pesach Malovany ◽

Amatzia Baram ◽

Kevin M. Woods ◽

Ronna Englesberg

Keyword(s):

International Atomic Energy Agency ◽

Atomic Energy ◽

Foreign Assistance ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Biological Weapons ◽

Chemical Weapons ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

Energy Agency ◽

Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽

Nuclear Device

The chapter deals with the Iraqi efforts to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear. It describes the various projects in each field, their history, the foreign assistance they got, the infrastructure the Iraqis built for them, their achievements and types of weapons the Iraqis produces and their arsenals, especially of the Chemical and Biological weapons. The efforts of the U. N. supervisory commissions (UNSCOM) and the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to disarm Iraq from those weapons and capabilities to renew the development and production of them by Iraq after 1991. The use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against the Kurds and the Iranian forces during the war between the two countries, and the possibility of using them against coalition forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. The Iraqi efforts to achieve a nuclear device in a crash program before the war in 1991.

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Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force

International Review of the Red Cross ◽

10.1017/s0020860400085156 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 37 (317) ◽

pp. 208-209 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Peter Herby

Keyword(s):

First World War ◽

Chemical Warfare ◽

Biological Weapons ◽

Chemical Weapons ◽

World War ◽

Chemical Weapons Convention ◽

The First World War ◽

Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽

Biological Weapons Convention ◽

First World

The Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, of 13 January 1993 (Chemical Weapons Convention - CWC) enters into force on 29 April 1997, following the deposit by Hungary on 31 October 1996 of the 65th instrument of ratification. This landmark Convention complements and reinforces the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons by also banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons — as well as their use — and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles. The 1925 Geneva Protocol was adopted following a dramatic appeal against chemical warfare by the ICRC at the end of the First World War. The Biological Weapons Convention, in force since 1975, has outlawed the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons.

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29. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The Globalization of World Politics ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198825548.003.0029 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 466-480

Author(s):

Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Keyword(s):

World Politics ◽

The Other ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Biological Weapons ◽

Chemical Weapons ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

International Intervention ◽

Nuclear Disaster ◽

Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽

Fukushima Nuclear Disaster

This chapter focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It examines the patterns that can be observed in the spread and use/non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons since 1945, how nuclear weapons have changed world politics, and whether non-proliferation efforts have been successful. The chapter first provides an overview of WMD technology and its spread before discussing biological and chemical weapons. It then considers theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation and the evolution of non-proliferation efforts. Two case studies are presented, one dealing with the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the other with the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran. There is also an Opposing Opinions box that asks whether the use of chemical weapons in 2013 should have been a red line triggering international intervention in Syria.

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The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention

The American Journal of International Law ◽

10.1017/s0002930000030098 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 101 (2) ◽

pp. 271-321 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jack M. Beard

Keyword(s):

Great Powers ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Biological Weapons ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

Legal Regime ◽

Foreign State ◽

Capitol Hill ◽

Anthrax Spores ◽

The Cold War ◽

Biological Weapons Convention

In 1972 a historic attempt to create the world’s first international legal regime banning the development and possession of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) culminated in the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Crippled by key compromises made by the great powers in pursuit of various self-interested security objectives in the context of the Cold War, the Convention is fundamentally flawed. Although the BWC purports to oudaw the development and possession of all biological weapons, deadlier and more sophisticated biological weapons than were imaginable in 1972 can now be and have been produced, as evidenced in October 2001 by two letters sent to the Capitol Hill offices of Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. These letters reportedly contained direatening notes and a dangerous and sophisticated form of “weapons-grade” anthrax spores. Even though both die sender of these letters and the source of the anthrax remain unknown, the technical sophistication of the spores led some experts to suggest that the attacker was supported by a U.S. “biodefense” laboratory or an advanced foreign-state-run biological weapons (BW) facility because the spores could not have been produced by an amateur working in his basement.

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Conflict Management and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Leiden Journal of International Law ◽

10.1017/s092215659700006x ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

pp. 81-90

Author(s):

Ian R. Kenyon ◽

Treasa Dunworth

Keyword(s):

Cold War ◽

Conflict Management ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Chemical Weapons ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

International Treaty ◽

Post Cold War ◽

Chemical Weapons Convention ◽

Un General Assembly ◽

Multilateral Regimes

While conflict management is an important part of any international treaty, it is particularly important in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which will enter into force on 29 April 1997. Disarmament is the primary goal of the Convention and, therefore, by definition, it will encroach on the sovereignty and security interests of its state-parties. Negotiated by the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament over more than 20 years, the Treaty was finally approved by that body in September 1992 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December of that year. The Convention's provisions reflect the new world into which it was born. The regime established by the Convention to verify compliance with its terms is unprecedented in terms of its scope and depth, and because state-parties will have no right to refuse verification activities specified in the Convention. It is also unprecedented in that all state-parties are treated equally, unlike some other multilateral regimes related to the control of weapons of mass destruction negotiated earlier. Nonetheless, such an extensive regime, made possible by the politics of a post-Cold-War world, will inevitably encounter unexpected complications and unforeseen difficulties. This will be so particularly with respect to compliance and interpreting the results of verification activities; therefore, the provisions in the Convention for managing potential or actual conflict will be cruical for it to operate effectively.

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20. Weapons of Mass Destruction

Contemporary Security Studies ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198804109.003.0020 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 300-317

Author(s):

James J. Wirtz

Keyword(s):

At Risk ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

International Politics ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Biological Weapons ◽

Chemical Weapons ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

State Actors

This chapter examines how weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) work and the effects they might have if used on the battlefield or against civilian targets. The threat posed by WMD proliferation to state actors is of increasing concern, and it is even more alarming if these weapons are deployed for terrorism purposes. A chemical weapons attack against a major sporting venue, for example, could kill thousands of people, while a successful anthrax attack might place hundreds of thousands at risk. The chapter considers how WMDs such as nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons have been used in war and how they have shaped the practice of international politics.

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26. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The Globalization of World Politics ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198739852.003.0026 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Keyword(s):

World Politics ◽

The Other ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Biological Weapons ◽

Chemical Weapons ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

International Intervention ◽

Nuclear Disaster ◽

Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽

Fukushima Nuclear Disaster

This chapter focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It examines the patterns that can be observed in the spread and use/non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons since 1945, how nuclear weapons have changed world politics, and whether non-proliferation efforts have been successful. The chapter first provides an overview of WMD technology and its spread before discussing biological and chemical weapons. It then considers theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation and the evolution of non-proliferation efforts. Two case studies are presented, one dealing with the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the other with the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran. There is also an Opposing Opinions box that asks whether the use of chemical weapons in 2013 should have been a red line triggering international intervention in Syria.

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20. Weapons of Mass Destruction

Contemporary Security Studies ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198708315.003.0020 ◽

2015 ◽

Author(s):

James J. Wirtz

Keyword(s):

At Risk ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

International Politics ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Biological Weapons ◽

Chemical Weapons ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

State Actors

This chapter examines how weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) work and the effects they might have if used on the battlefield or against civilian targets. The threat posed by WMD proliferation to state actors is of increasing concern, and it is even more alarming if these weapons are deployed for terrorism purposes. A chemical weapons attack against a major sporting venue, for example, could kill thousands of people, while a successful anthrax attack might place hundreds of thousands at risk. The chapter considers how WMDs such as nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons have been used in war and how they have shaped the practice of international politics.

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