scholarly journals The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Beard
Keyword(s):  
Great Powers ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
Foreign State ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
Anthrax Spores ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

In 1972 a historic attempt to create the world’s first international legal regime banning the development and possession of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) culminated in the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Crippled by key compromises made by the great powers in pursuit of various self-interested security objectives in the context of the Cold War, the Convention is fundamentally flawed. Although the BWC purports to oudaw the development and possession of all biological weapons, deadlier and more sophisticated biological weapons than were imaginable in 1972 can now be and have been produced, as evidenced in October 2001 by two letters sent to the Capitol Hill offices of Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. These letters reportedly contained direatening notes and a dangerous and sophisticated form of “weapons-grade” anthrax spores. Even though both die sender of these letters and the source of the anthrax remain unknown, the technical sophistication of the spores led some experts to suggest that the attacker was supported by a U.S. “biodefense” laboratory or an advanced foreign-state-run biological weapons (BW) facility because the spores could not have been produced by an amateur working in his basement.

un Security Council vs. Weapons of Mass Destruction

2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Hans Blix
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Cold War

International institutions given the task to maintain collective security and to seek disarmament need to build on cooperation between major powers. The authors of the un Charter vested great powers in the Security Council but a consensus between the five permanent great powers was required for use of the powers. This inevitably paralyzed the Council during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the permanent members have remained unable jointly to pursue disarmament, but they have succeeded in several remarkable cases to reach consensus, notably on measures to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. The quick action to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria was a win-win case led by us-Russian diplomacy, while the comprehensive deal settling the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program was a victory for patient diplomacy involving all permanent members and the eu. These actions show the potentials of the Council.

Can Biological, Toxin, and Chemical Warfare be Eliminated?

1992 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meryl Nass
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Warfare ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Similar Chemical ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

Is it possible to prevent biological, chemical, and toxin warfare from occurring? The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an international treaty banning the possession and hostile use of biological and toxin weapons, already exists; and a similar chemical weapons treaty is currently being negotiated. The older Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the “first use” of these weapons in war. It might seem that the threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction is nearly at an end.

scholarly journals Threat of biological weapons

Securitologia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Bogdan Michailiuk
Keyword(s):  
Current Level ◽  
Biological Weapon ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Biological Terrorism ◽  
Unpublished Information

The biological weapons often is defined as ‘weapons of mass destruction poor’, because this is relatively cheap and easy in the production, hidden and relocation. The risk of the use biological weapons still seems to be very real. A possibility of using weapons of mass destruction (biological weapon) is arousing special danger by contemporary terrorist organizations. In this article in a synthetic, based on the available references and the unpublished information, author present the current level of threat of biological terrorism.

WMD Compliance and Enforcement in a Changing Global Context

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Wunderlich ◽  
Harald Müller ◽  
Una Jakob
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
World Order ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Global Context ◽  
The Past ◽  
Cooperative Security ◽  
The Cold War

The regimes for the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are essential ingredients of the global order. Yet this order is currently in transition: the bipolarity of the Cold War has given way to a more complex, multipolar world order characterized by conflicts of interest and great power competition rather than cooperative security. This competition brings with it rising strategic uncertainties which endanger stability and have far reaching implications for WMD-related agreements. To better understand the implications of this changing global context for WMD arms control and disarmament measures this report looks at the past, present and future prospects for WMD-related treaties. The report begins by outlining four broad yet interlinked approaches to arms control and disarmament before considering how these have been applied to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the past and how these measures could be applied in the future.

Unconventional Weapons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg
Keyword(s):  
International Atomic Energy Agency ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Device

The chapter deals with the Iraqi efforts to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear. It describes the various projects in each field, their history, the foreign assistance they got, the infrastructure the Iraqis built for them, their achievements and types of weapons the Iraqis produces and their arsenals, especially of the Chemical and Biological weapons. The efforts of the U. N. supervisory commissions (UNSCOM) and the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to disarm Iraq from those weapons and capabilities to renew the development and production of them by Iraq after 1991. The use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against the Kurds and the Iranian forces during the war between the two countries, and the possibility of using them against coalition forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. The Iraqi efforts to achieve a nuclear device in a crash program before the war in 1991.

13. The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2018 ◽  
pp. 220-237
Author(s):  
John Baylis
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter explores a variety of questions on how to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, as well as the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war era from arms control to more forcible means to tackle nuclear proliferation. It then considers the emergence of new ideas, first in the Clinton administration, and then in the Bush administration, that focused less on arms control and more on counterproliferation. It also examines a host of problems and dilemmas associated with counterproliferation, the Obama administration's policy of engagement and ‘tough but direct diplomacy’, and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions. Finally, it reflects on future prospects for strategic nuclear arms control.

12. The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Baylis
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Bill Clinton ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines issues regarding the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its implications for international security. It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, and the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war period from arms control to more forcible means to tackle proliferation. It then considers concerns that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s about the continuing utility of arms control as an effective means of dealing with WMDs. It also analyses new ideas that began to take shape, first during the presidency of Bill Clinton, and then under George W. Bush, about more militarily driven approaches, associated with counterproliferation. The chapter concludes with an assessment of ‘the return to arms control’ by the administration of Barack Obama and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions.

19. Coercive Diplomacy:

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Viggo Jakobsen
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
The Other ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Coercive Diplomacy ◽  
Military Involvement ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Strategic Context

This chapter examines how coercive diplomacy has emerged as a strategy for states in dealing with the opponent without resorting to full-scale war. Coercive diplomacy involves the use of military threats and/or limited force (sticks) coupled with inducements and assurances (carrots) in order to influence the opponent to do something it would prefer not to. This chapter first explains what coercive diplomacy is and considers its requirements for success. It then shows how states have employed coercive diplomacy to manage crises and conflicts during the three strategic eras that followed the end of the Cold War. It also discusses the importance of the strategic context in shaping the use of coercive diplomacy by presenting two case studies, one relating to the United States’s conflict with Libya due to the latter’s weapons of mass destruction, and the other relating to Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine.

On-Site Inspection Measures and Interviews

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Huxsoll
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Special Commission ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Development Support ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Ongoing Monitoring

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 956-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Medical Supplies ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
On Site Inspection

At the conclusion of the 1991 UN enforcement action against Iraq, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting the terms for a cease-fire. The resolution required, among other things, that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,” of all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and associated materials and facilities. Further, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN special commission to carry out “on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities,” and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for “destruction, removal or rendering harmless.” Similar requirements were imposed with respect to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council allowed exports to Iraq of foodstuffs and medical supplies (on the condition that a UN sanctions committee had been notified) and also other commodities (if approved by the same committee). The Security Council decided that the sanctions regime would be lifted, however, once Iraq complied with its obligations on the destruction and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document