Judge Peter Kooijmans

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan G. Lammers

In a small note which Peter Kooijmans wrote to me in answer to a letter in which I congratulated him with his election as Judge in the International Court of Justice – the first Netherlands Judge in the Court after World War II apart from Professor Riphagen who only served as a Judge ad hoc in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. case – he stated that he considered himself to be a privileged man. Privileged, because the new position would allow him to continue to remain active in the field of international law considerably beyond the retirement age of 65 which applies to professors of international law and most other people in The Netherlands. Privileged, I would like to add, also in another respect. Very rarely it will be given to one person in his lifetime to fulfil so many different honourable positions in the field of international law and international relations at such a high level of responsibility as has been the case with Peter Kooijmans: Professor of public international law, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, State Secretary (Staatssecretaris) for Foreign Affairs, in particular disarmament matters (1973–1977), Minister for Foreign Affairs and, finally, Judge in the International Court of Justice.

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 632-638
Author(s):  
Filippo Fontanelli

In August 2012, the First Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court or Court), the highest Italian domestic court, issued a judgment upholding Germany’s sovereign immunity from civil claims brought by Italian war crime victims against Paul Albers and eight others in the Italian courts (Albers). In so doing, the Court overruled its own earlier decisions and also reversed the judgment of April 20, 2011, by the Italian Military Court of Appeal (Military Court), which had upheld such claims relating to war crimes committed by German forces in Italy during World War II. With this ruling, the Court of Cassation put an end to its decade long effort to find an exception to the well-known rule of customary international law providing for sovereign immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction for actsjure imperii. Thisrevirementresulted from the Court’s decision to give effect to the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) inGermany v. Italy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-643
Author(s):  
Matthew Garrod

Abstract Since the 1980s, the idea that piracy is the “original” and “paradigmatic” universal jurisdiction crime in customary international law has been increasingly supported by weighty scholarship. In the wake of the unprecedented surge in Somali piracy, this view is gaining ground among various powerful actors in international law. Yet, remarkably little empirically grounded scholarship exists in support of universal jurisdiction. This Article provides the first comprehensive empirical analysis of state practice in response to Somali piracy in a ten-year period since 2006. Additionally, the data on Somali piracy are compared with the empirical findings of state practice regarding international crimes, which are more “heinous” than piracy, since the end of World War II to 2016. In so doing, this Article brings new insight and the first thorough critique of what most scholars, governments, the UN and even the International Court of Justice have said on universal jurisdiction, its purpose and the basis for it in international law. In view of inter-state tensions and conflict caused by universal jurisdiction and a move towards law codification, there is now a pressing need for a paradigm shift in the concept of universal jurisdiction for both piracy and international crimes, a step away from conventional scholarly accounts, and the grand narratives from which they proceed, to a position that has a solid basis in the actual practice of states. Empirically and historically informed, it is proposed that “universal jurisdiction” for both categories of crime provides a basis in international law permitting the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction over offences involving foreign nationals abroad that have a close nexus between the case over which jurisdiction is asserted and the state asserting jurisdiction. Common and traditionally held assumptions that universal jurisdiction is based solely on the grave nature of crimes and is applied by states absent any nexus to offences and in the interest of the international community are unfounded.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-148
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kubiak

Eric The Red’s Land cannot be found on contemporary maps. There are not many older cartographic publications in which such an area would be marked either. They were published in only one country, Norway, and for a limited time. This was the result of the territorial claims that Norway reported to parts of eastern Greenland. To locate the area in geographical space, the name of Eric The Red’s Land was used (Norwegian: Eirik Raudes Land). Norwegian claims to East Greenland met the strong opposition of Denmark. In the interwar period, it seemed that the verdict of the Permanent International Court of Justice in The Hague, adopted in 1933 and recognizing Denmark’s sovereignty over all of Greenland, had ended the dispute. However, during World War II, Norway raised the issue of the possession of eastern Greenland again. This happened at a time when both Nordic countries were occupied by Germany. The cooperation with Germany undertaken by “Arctic expansionists” ultimately intersected with Norwegian ambitions in the eastern part of Greenland.


Author(s):  
Gallus Nick

The period of an international tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction is the span of time during which an act must have occurred before the tribunal may consider if the act breached an obligation. There are many questions concerning this particular aspect of an international tribunal’s jurisdiction. Does a tribunal have power over acts that occurred after the entry into force of the obligation allegedly breached but before the tribunal’s jurisdiction was accepted? What about acts that began before the tribunal’s jurisdiction was accepted but continued after? To what extent can acts before the period of the tribunal’s jurisdiction affect its decision on whether or not there is a breach through acts afterwards?This book examines these questions in depth. Despite its importance, the temporal jurisdiction of international tribunals is not well understood. Tribunals often confuse different aspects of their jurisdiction and refuse to hear cases they should have heard, or agree to hear cases they should not. This book reduces this confusion by clarifying the different limits on the temporal jurisdiction of international tribunals and the important distinctions between those limits. The book examines the temporal limits resulting from the entry into force of the obligation allegedly breached, from the acceptance of the tribunal's jurisdiction, and from the period of limitation, as well as the effect of acts that occurred before these limits. The book comprehensively compares decisions from a wide variety of sources including the International Court of Justice Human Rights Courts World Trade Organization panels and investment treaty tribunals. It comments on decisions that arose from some of the most notorious events of the twentieth century including the ‘Katyn Massacre’ of the Second World War the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ‘forced disappearance’ of American political opponents. It reviews these decisions and identifies common principles that help define the temporal jurisdiction of tribunals to decide breaches of international law.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 878-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Brownlie ◽  
C. J. Apperley

1. This Memorandum has been prepared in accordance with the request of the Foreign Affairs Committee (letter dated 28 July 1999), which request referred to a written memorandum “on the area of international law“.1 In the course of his career as a member of the English Bar, specialising in international disputes, the writer has worked as legal adviser and/or advocate for at least 35 States. In this context it is necessary to point to the fact that, as a part of his professional involvements, he has acted as Counsel and Advocate in the recent proceedings before the International Court of Justice on behalf of Yugoslavia. It is also necessary to stress that the Memorandum represents his own views and that there has been no input from any Government or Government-related organisation.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan I. Charney

Judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and awards of ad hoc arbitration tribunals carry special weight in international maritime boundary law. On its face, the international maritime boundary law codified in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is indeterminate. For the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, the legal obligation of coastal states is to delimit the boundary “by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” The article on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the territorial sea is no more determinative despite the fact that it makes direct references to the equidistant line, special circumstances and historic title. In spite of this indeterminacy, if not because of it, coastal states have found that third-party dispute settlement procedures can effectively resolve maritime boundary delimitation disputes. As a consequence, there are more judgments and awards on maritime boundary disputes than on any other subject of international law, and this trend is continuing.


2001 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 373-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Leen De Smet

On 14 February 2002, the International Court of Justice (the Court) delivered its judgment in the case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000. In this case, the Court had the opportunity to take an authoritative stance on, and to contribute to the development of, two major questions in the field of immunities and jurisdiction of contemporary international law: do Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity against prosecution by national courts of another state for crimes under international law, and how far can a state go in granting universal jurisdiction to its domestic courts?


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

When the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht became a member of the International Court of Justice in February, 1955 (a position he was to fill effectively for barely five years, until the fall of 1959), he went to The Hague with some thirty years of devoted study and practice of international law behind him. As teacher and student of international law, as a most highly qualified publicist (in the words of Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the Court) of recognized universal authority, he had devoted himself both to the law in general and in particular to the problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, whether by the Permanent Court of International Justice and its present-day successor, the International Court of Justice, or by ad hoc arbitration tribunals. Indeed, his writings as a whole display a rare preoccupation with the entire philosophy and the practical problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, together with a deep understanding of its limitations and a satisfying freedom both from putting forward extravagant claims in its behalf and from purely theoretical speculations.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Gardam

This article considers the contribution of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) to the development of the rules and principles of international humanitarian law (‘IHL’). In recent times, the contribution of the Court to this body of the law has been overshadowed by the work of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR, established by the Security Council to punish those responsible for serious breaches of IHL. Nevertheless, the ICJ, in both its contentious and advisory jurisdictions, has considered the provisions of IHL on a number of occasions, and in the process has clarified many areas of IHL. This article is concerned with one particular issue: how does the Court perceive the fundamental nature of IHL? The analysis adopts two themes. First, an assessment is made of the part played by the Court in the process of bringing IHL into conformity with the changing emphasis of general international law. In both the Nicaragua case and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the Court continued the process of what has been referred to as the “humanization of international law.” Second, the approach of the Court to the vexed issue of the relationship between ius ad bellum and IHL is considered. The conclusion is reached that the approach of the Court to this latter issue has undermined its contribution to infusing the humanitarian ethos into IHL.


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