Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan I. Charney

Judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and awards of ad hoc arbitration tribunals carry special weight in international maritime boundary law. On its face, the international maritime boundary law codified in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is indeterminate. For the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, the legal obligation of coastal states is to delimit the boundary “by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” The article on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the territorial sea is no more determinative despite the fact that it makes direct references to the equidistant line, special circumstances and historic title. In spite of this indeterminacy, if not because of it, coastal states have found that third-party dispute settlement procedures can effectively resolve maritime boundary delimitation disputes. As a consequence, there are more judgments and awards on maritime boundary disputes than on any other subject of international law, and this trend is continuing.

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 563-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Churchill

Abstract This is the latest in a series of annual surveys reviewing dispute settlement in the law of the sea, both under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and outside the framework of the Convention. The main developments during 2012 were the delivery of judgments by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case and by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua/Colombia case, both concerned with maritime boundary delimitation; and the institution of Annex VII arbitration by Argentina against Ghana relating to the arrest of a State-owned vessel and the subsequent order of provisional measures by the ITLOS. These and other developments are reviewed in detail below.


Author(s):  
D.M. McRae

On March 29, 1979 Canada and the United States signed a treaty to submit their dispute over the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine to binding settlement. The event is worthy of note not only because it is the first occasion since the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, in 1910, that the two countries have submitted a dispute over their offshore jurisdiction to third party settlement but also because it constitutes the first reference by any state of a question to a chamber of the International Court of Justice. However, this reference to the Court is only conditional and the parties have provided for the possible removal of the case from the Court and for its submission to an ad hoc court of arbitration. Thus, as well as providing a further opportunity for an international tribunal to consider the law relating to the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the treaty raises some interesting questions about recourse to a chamber of the International Court of Justice.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fayokemi Olorundami

With the International Court of Justice (icj) moving away from the application of equitable principles in favour of its three-stage delimitation methodology, maritime boundary delimitations are now described as objective and predictable. This article assesses the accuracy of this description by examining the decisions of the Court and Tribunals in some recent delimitation cases. It is argued that the delimitation of maritime boundaries cannot still be regarded as objective and predictable as exemplified in the decisions discussed. Each of the three stages in the three-stage methodology, namely the drawing of a provisional equidistance line, the adjustment or shifting of that line based on the presence of relevant circumstances and the (dis)proportionality test will be analysed in order to support this position. This article identifies a fixation with following the three-stage methodology (even when inappropriate) as, ironically, the driver for subjectivity and unpredictability in maritime boundary delimitation decisions.


1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan E. Boyle

The entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), on 16 November 1994, is probably the most important development in the settlement of international disputes since the adoption of the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Not only does the Convention create a new international court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”), it also makes extensive provision for compulsory dispute-settlement procedures involving States, the International Seabed Authority (“ISBA”), seabed mining contractors and, potentially, a range of other entities. Implementation of the Convention has spawned a number of inter-State disputes to add to the cases already before the International Court. The initiation of the ITLOS not only opens up new possibilities for settling these disputes but it also has implications for the future role of the International Court and ad hoc arbitration in the law of the sea and more generally. It contributes to the proliferation of international tribunals and adds to the potential for fragmentation both of the substantive law and of the procedures available for settling disputes. Judges Oda and Guillaume have argued that the ITLOS is a futile institution, that the UNCLOS negotiators were misguided in depriving the International Court of its central role in ocean disputes and that creation of a specialised tribunal may destroy the unity of international law. The law of the sea, both judges argue, is an essential part of international law and any dispute concerning the application and interpretation of that law should be seen as subject to settlement by the International Court.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 738-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandy Ghandhi

The International Court of Justice is not a human rights court but it does hear human rights cases.1This is hardly remarkable. As Professor Ian Brownlie has pointed out ‘[h]uman rights problems occur in specific legal contexts. The issues may arise… within the framework of a standard-setting convention, or within general international law.’2Because human rights treaties normally have their own dispute settlement procedure, the situations in which the International Court of Justice is more likely to have to grapple with human rights issues lie within the realms of general international law or in non-human rights specific treaty provisions, which may, nevertheless, raise such issues. In addition, some human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, contain provisions specifically referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.3Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has been involved in a number of cases involving human rights questions.


2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Churchill

AbstractThis is the fourth of a projected series of annual surveys reviewing dispute settlement under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 2007 was the busiest year for dispute settlement in the law of the sea for some time. The main developments under Part XV of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea were the award of the arbitral tribunal in the Guyana/Suriname Case and two prompt-release-of-vessel judgments by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Outside the framework of the Convention, the International Court of Justice gave judgments in two maritime boundary cases—one on the merits (Nicaragua v. Honduras) and the other on jurisdiction (Nicaragua v. Colombia).


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 352-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Crook

During 2002, countries from all regions, especially Africa, resorted to the International Court of Justice; only one of the Court's 2002 judgments involved an OECD countiy. The Court's work during the year also shows the continued importance of boundary issues for states and for the Court.The Court again completed a substantial program of work, resolving three cases with final judgments. In February, it triggered substantial controversy by finding that a Belgian court's warrant for the arrest of the then foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Congo”) violated international law. In October, it resolved a complex of boundary disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, although by year-end Nigeria had not yet implemented the Court's key requirement—withdrawal from the Bakassi Peninsula. In December, comparing sparse effectivités, it concluded that Malaysia, and not Indonesia, had sovereignty over two small disputed islands.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
SANTIAGO VILLALPANDO

In the process of selection of articles for the International Court of Justice section at the Editorial Board of the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL), we tend to be seduced by those manuscripts which are effective in making use of the jurisprudence of the Court as an instrument to engage in an in-depth examination of substantive legal issues of a general nature. This reflects our conviction – hardly an original one, since it appears to be shared by our entire legal community – that the Court has a fundamental role to play in the advancement of international law as a legal system. It also echoes an idea that is present in the mission statement of our journal, which is conceived as ‘a forum for two vital areas, namely international legal theory and international dispute settlement’, thus establishing an intrinsic link between them. But how is the Court's contribution to the development of international law to be assessed? And what do we expect from a scholarly piece examining its case law in this respect?


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