scholarly journals Development assistance and the CDM – how to interpret ‘financial additionality’

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL DUTSCHKE ◽  
AXEL MICHAELOWA
Keyword(s):  
Capacity Building ◽  
Clean Development Mechanism ◽  
Development Assistance ◽  
Official Development Assistance ◽  
Development Assistance Committee ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations ◽  
Project Level

International climate negotiations have specified that projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) should not lead to a ‘diversion’ of official development assistance (ODA). It is however unchallenged that ODA can be used in capacity building for the CDM. Diversion can be interpreted in purpose, sectoral, and regional terms. There are possibilities to use ODA benchmarks to define diversion such as the UN 0.7 per cent target but they are unlikely to be politically acceptable. On the project level, three main options exist but none of them is perfect. The Development Assistance Committee of OECD endorses deduction of the value of emissions credits (CERs) from ODA. This however leads to a long-term pressure on the ODA level. Differentiating an ODA-financed baseline project and a ‘piggyback’ CDM option is likely to be arbitrary in many circumstances. Even if CERs do not accrue for the ODA share of the investment, still private CDM projects are crowded out due to the subsidizing of CDM projects.

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Characteristic Feature ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

Simulating International Climate Negotiations in Classrooms

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-30
Author(s):  
Thomas Hickmann ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Study Programs ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

A simulation of the international climate negotiations was designed for more than 50 students of political science and other study programs dealing with sustainability. A key advantage of such simulations is that they are highly adaptable to groups of different sizes, academic backgrounds, or learning levels and can be used to teach a number of major concepts within the same framework.. the primary objective of such simulations is that students grasp the difficulties to achieve collective action

International Climate Negotiations

Green Capital ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 137-151
Author(s):  
Christian de Perthuis ◽  
Pierre-André Jouvet ◽  
Michael Westlake
Keyword(s):  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations
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