scholarly journals Liar's war: Protecting civilians from disinformation during armed conflict

Author(s):  
Eian Katz

Abstract Disinformation in armed conflict may pose several distinctive forms of harm to civilians: exposure to retaliatory violence, distortion of information vital to securing human needs, and severe mental suffering. The gravity of these harms, along with the modern nature of wartime disinformation, is out of keeping with the traditional classification of disinformation in international humanitarian law (IHL) as a permissible ruse of war. A patchwork set of protections drawn from IHL, international human rights law and international criminal law may be used to limit disinformation operations during armed conflict, but numerous gaps and ambiguities undermine the force of this legal framework, calling for further scholarly attention and clarification.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-58
Author(s):  
Sardar M. A. Waqar Khan Arif

Human rights are available to everyone on the basis of humanity. Universality, non-discrimination, equality and inalienability are core principles governing International Human rights Law (IHRL). The law governing armed conflict or war is known as International humanitarian Law (IHL). In the case of armed conflict, IHRL poses certain obligations on states along with humanitarian obligations. In this context, this article identifies the international human rights obligations of States in armed conflict. It argues that States must respect, promote, protect and fulfill human rights obligations of individuals, in the case of armed conflict, with increasing and serious concern, by analyzing the applicable legal framework under IHRL. It also addresses the extraterritorial application of IHRL and its limitations and derogations in armed conflict. Further, it discusses contemporary challenges for States in jurisdictional applicability and implementation of IHRL. To that extent, the argument developed throughout this article is that States have obligations under IHRL, irrespective of humanitarian obligations, not only in peace situations but also in the case of war or armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Bruch Carl ◽  
Payne Cymie R ◽  
Sjöstedt Britta

This chapter looks at how the concern for the environment in relation to armed conflict can be addressed from several bodies of international law. These diverse bodies of law emerged largely isolated from one another: international humanitarian law, international environmental law, international criminal law, international human rights law, the United Nations (UN) Charter, and so on. Hence, a fragmented and unclear legal framework protects the environment in times of armed conflict. The chapter focuses on the interlinkages between international environmental law and other bodies of international law to protect the environment in relation to armed conflict. The thesis is that international environmental law norms are increasingly shaping protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict, in contrast to the relative rigidity of international humanitarian law norms, which is traditionally the starting point for analysing wartime environmental protection. The chapter begins with a brief consideration of international law applicable during all temporal phases of armed conflict: before conflict (including conflict prevention); during conflict; and after conflict. It then explores the issues and relevant law particular to specific phases.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Roberta Arnold

One of the least clarified areas of international law is the legal regime applicable to non-international armed conflict (NIAC) – that is, where hostilities occur between state and non-state actors (NSAs) or between two or more NSAs.1 This can be explained by the reticence of states to grant legality to such movements and their preference to label them as criminal movements or terrorist groups.2 The result is that the regulation of NIAC is still limited to the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (GCs) and their Additional Protocol II of 1977 (Additional Protocol II or AP II).3 While Common Article 3 provides only a rudimentary framework of minimum standards, Additional Protocol II, which usefully supplements it, is still less detailed than the rules governing international armed conflict (IAC). Moreover, in contrast to Common Article 3,4 it has not yet attained customary status.5 This situation is a source of concern. Faced with the horrors committed in NIACs such as those in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s, and the awareness of an inadequate legal framework, the international criminal law (ICL) community decided to resort to international human rights law (IHRL) and ICL to fill the gaps of international humanitarian law (IHL) applicable to NIAC.6


Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

The general introduction sets the scene for the legal issues addressed in this book by presenting their relevance in most recent conflicts and other situations of violence, including in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, the Central African Republic, and Kenya. It also introduces the legal framework the book sets out to examine, notably international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law. The introductory chapter further presents the book’s methodology, introduces its structure, and explains key terms and concepts. These include, in particular, the terms ‘non-state armed group’, ‘international legal personality’, and ‘degree of organization’, which are especially relevant throughout the book.


Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

This chapter provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. It argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the jus ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The chapter then considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the application of the right to life in armed conflict, particularly in territory not controlled by the state conducting the strike. The chapter then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes, such as the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section considers the law relating to the use of force by states against non-state groups abroad.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 759-783
Author(s):  
Anja Matwijkiw

When responses to international crimes are managed in terms of post-conflict justice, this event may end ‘the demarcation debate’ before it has begun, thereby rendering it superfluous among legal scholars. This is to say that the transition from theory to reality arguably has the effect of cancelling any sharp distinction between international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as extending international criminal justice into the moral territory. Certainly, this is a premise for the dual-aspect defense of those rights that help to explain the non-separation. However, to the extent that the defense discords with traditional assumptions, relevant aspects of pro-separation reasoning must be considered. These are accommodated under the triple-thesis whereby the unequal status of different (rights-)categories limit norm-integration. The author’s account of the competing programs shows a series of flaws in the case of the triple-thesis doctrine, amounting to a vicious circle ‘argument’.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.


2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. In particular, it is increasingly the case that hostilities now occur alongside ‘everyday’ situations. This has led to a pressing need to determine when a ‘conduct of hostilities’ model (governed by international humanitarian law – IHL) applies and when a ‘law enforcement’ model (governed by international human rights law – IHRL) applies. This, in turn, raises the question of whether these two legal regimes are incompatible or whether they might be applied in parallel. It is on this question that the current article focuses, examining it at the level of principle. Whilst most accounts of the principles underlying these two areas of law focus on humanitarian considerations, few have compared the role played by necessity in each. This article seeks to address this omission. It demonstrates that considerations of necessity play a prominent role in both IHL and IHRL, albeit with differing consequences. It then applies this necessity-based analysis to suggest a principled basis for rationalising the relationship between IHL and IHRL, demonstrating how this approach would operate in practice. It is shown that, by emphasising the role of necessity in IHL and IHRL, an approach can be adopted that reconciles the two in a manner that is sympathetic to their object and purpose.


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