The Next Stage of Reforms: Korean Corporate Governance in the Post-Asian Financial Crisis Era

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Joongi Kim

AbstractFollowing the 1997 financial crisis, Korea underwent a dramatic overhaul of its corporate governance framework. Drastic changes in its legal and regulatory infrastructure led to more transparent and accountable companies. Boards of directors, shareholders, stakeholders, and auditors began to function effectively and even a corporate control market emerged. Many forms of internal and external corporate governance and market-oriented discipline were established. Korean companies are poised to make a quantum leap to reach the most competitive international levels of corporate governance. This paper argues that Korea must continue its reform efforts. It first discusses the Asian financial crisis and the first stage of reforms that followed. It then explores the areas where Korea needs to undergo the next stage of reforms. It will argue that only then can Korean corporations receive proper valuations. Korean companies have indeed come a long way but lingering perceptions of weak corporate governance thwart them from becoming world-class competitors.

Author(s):  
Anastasia Stepanova ◽  
Olga Ivantsova

Anastasia N. Stepanova - National Research University The Higher School of Economics E-mail: [email protected] Ivantsova Olga Mikhailovna - expert: Faculty of Economics, Research and Training Laboratory of Corporate Finance, HSE. E-mail: [email protected] This paper aims to investigate the effect that internal corporate governance mechanisms have on the performance of commercial banks, how it differs for developed and emerging European markets, and whether it has changed as a result of the financial crisis. The key statistical tool used in the paper is the panel data analysis of the sample of 150 banks from 27 countries, over the period 2004-2011. We document the evidence partially supporting the effectiveness of smaller boards of directors, while the board independence seems to be negatively associated with the strategic performance of banks, especially in emerging markets and in times of a crisis. In emerging markets, state-owned banks appear to be more market-efficient, while high ownership concentration is considered by market players to be a negative signal. Studying the 2008 financial crisis period provides the evidence for structural movements in nonfinancial performance drivers.


2007 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 941-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongmoo Jay Choi ◽  
Sae Woon Park ◽  
Sean Sehyun Yoo

AbstractThis paper examines the valuation impacts of outside independent directors in Korea, where a regulation requiring outside directors was instituted after the Asian financial crisis. In contrast to studies of U.S. firms, the effects of independent directors on firm performance are strongly positive. Foreigners also have positive impacts. The effects of indigenous institutions such as chaebol or family control are insignificant or negative. This implies that the effect of outsiders depends on board composition as well as the nature of the market in which the firm operates.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-215
Author(s):  
Frederik G. Worang ◽  
David A. Holloway

Corporate frauds and failures in Indonesian have continued despite the corporate governance principles of Indonesia’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which have been strengthened following the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. This appears to indicate that corporate governance principles primarily adopted from developed Western nations are not adequate to address problems faced by SOEs in Indonesia. This primarily analytical paper evaluates the current corporate governance practices in Indonesian SOEs in light of the prevailing political and corporate culture. Given the complexity of Indonesia’s political and corporate culture the adoption of corporate governance principles from Western nations as promulgated by the OECD and/or the Cadbury report are inadequate to reduce corporate mismanagement and failure among SOEs. The study also utilizes some qualitative interview data from thirty respondents at managerial level within three SOEs to aid the assessment of corporate governance practices and principles in the Indonesian context


2000 ◽  
Vol 58 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 141-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Johnson ◽  
Peter Boone ◽  
Alasdair Breach ◽  
Eric Friedman

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 386-398
Author(s):  
Basiru Salisu Kallamu ◽  
Nur Ashikin Mohd Saat

We examine the impact of corporate strategy and corporate governance on the performance of finance companies in Malaysia using data from 406 firm-year observations. The results indicate that diversification influence accounting returns negatively while separate risk management committee (RMC) influence market valuation of finance companies positively both in the period after the Asian financial crisis which also is the period after the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) was issued. Finally, the results indicate significant difference between the period before and after the Asian financial crisis and MCCG in terms of diversification and corporate governance in the finance companies. The results support agency theory which suggests that diversification may create further agency problem between the management and the shareholders


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