Supplemental Material for Optional-Switch Cognitive Flexibility in Primates: Chimpanzees’ (Pan troglodytes) Intermediate Susceptibility to Cognitive Set

2020 ◽  
Vol 134 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Pope ◽  
Joël Fagot ◽  
Adrien Meguerditchian ◽  
Julia Watzek ◽  
Sheina Lew-Levy ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Watzek ◽  
Sarah M. Pope ◽  
Sarah F. Brosnan

Abstract Learned rules help us accurately solve many problems, but by blindly following a strategy, we sometimes fail to find more efficient alternatives. Previous research found that humans are more susceptible to this “cognitive set” bias than other primates in a nonverbal computer task. We modified the task to test one hypothesis for this difference, that working memory influences the advantage of taking a shortcut. During training, 60 humans, 7 rhesus macaques, and 22 capuchin monkeys learned to select three icons in sequence. They then completed 96 baseline trials, in which only this learned rule could be used, and 96 probe trials, in which they could also immediately select the final icon. Rhesus and capuchin monkeys took this shortcut significantly more often than humans. Humans used the shortcut more in this new, easier task than in previous work, but started using it significantly later than the monkeys. Some participants of each species also used an intermediate strategy; they began the learned rule but switched to the shortcut after selecting the first item in the sequence. We suggest that these species differences arise from differences in rule encoding and in the relative efficiency of exploiting a familiar strategy versus exploring alternatives.


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Pope ◽  
Joël Fagot ◽  
Adrien Meguerditchian ◽  
David A. Washburn ◽  
William D. Hopkins

Through codified rule-use, humans can accurately solve many problems. Yet, mechanized strategies can also be costly. After adopting a solution strategy, humans often become blind to alternatives, even when those alternatives are more efficient. Termed cognitive set, this failure to switch from a familiar strategy to a better alternative has been considered universally human. Yet, our understanding of this phenomenon is derived almost exclusively from Western subjects. In this study, we used the nonverbal Learned Strategy–Direct Strategy (LS-DS) touchscreen task in which subjects are presented with an opportunity to use either a learned strategy or a more efficient, but novel, shortcut. We found that the remote, seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited enhanced shortcut-use on the LS-DS task, challenging the claim that cognitive set affects humans universally. In addition, we found that altering subjects’ conceptualization of the shortcut as a viable option significantly enhanced its subsequent use in Western but not Himba participants. We discuss how other aspects of cultural variation, namely, environmental uncertainty and educational background, might contribute to the observed cross-cultural differences in flexible strategy-use.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Pope ◽  
Joel Fagot ◽  
Adrien Meguerditchian ◽  
David Washburn ◽  
William D. Hopkins

Through codified rule-use humans can accurately solve many problems. Yet, mechanized strategies can also be costly. After adopting a solution strategy, humans often become blind to alternatives, even when those alternatives are more efficient. Termed cognitive set, this failure to switch from a familiar strategy to a better alternative has been considered universally human. Yet, our understanding of this phenomenon is derived almost exclusively from Western subjects. In this study, we used the nonverbal Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy (LS-DS) touch screen task in which subjects are presented with an opportunity to either use a learned strategy or a more efficient, but novel, shortcut. We found that the remote, seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited enhanced shortcut-use on the LS-DS task, challenging the claim that cognitive set affects humans universally. Additionally, we found that altering subjects’ conceptualization of the shortcut as a viable option significantly enhanced its subsequent use in Western but not Himba participants. We discuss how other aspects of cultural variation, namely environmental uncertainty and educational background, might contribute to the observed cross-cultural differences in flexible strategy-use.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Jablonka ◽  
Simona Ginsburg ◽  
Daniel Dor

Abstract Heyes argues that human metacognitive strategies (cognitive gadgets) evolved through cultural rather than genetic evolution. Although we agree that increased plasticity is the hallmark of human metacognition, we suggest cognitive malleability required the genetic accommodation of gadget-specific processes that enhanced the overall cognitive flexibility of humans.


1994 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Alyssa B. Rulf ◽  
Donna T. Bierschwale

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