University of Michigan's affirmative action case: a good bet for the Supreme Court

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Sharf ◽  
Paige Porter Wolf
1992 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 752
Author(s):  
Hugh Davis Graham ◽  
Melvin I. Urofsky

1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-178
Author(s):  
Omi Morgenstern Leissner

Israel Women's Network v. The Government of Israel (1994) 48(v) P.D. 501The petitioner, the Israel Women's Network, petitioned the Supreme Court of Justice against the appointment of a new member to the Ports and Railways Council and against the appointment of two new directors on behalf of the State to the board of directors of the State-controlled Oil Refinery. All three of the new appointees were men, such that neither of the two councils included a single woman in their composition. The petitioner disputed the constitutionality of these appointments arguing that in the particular circumstances and in line with sec. 18A of the Government Companies Law, the appointees ought to have been women. By a majority decision the Supreme Court held that the respondent did not fulfill the duty of affirmative action required by sec. 18A of the Law, and that the cancellation of the appointments made was justified.


2010 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Gerstmann ◽  
Christopher Shortell

In this paper, we argue that there is no single test called strict scrutiny when the Court considers claims of racial discrimination. In fact, the Court changes the rules depending on why and how the government is using race. By examining racial redistricting, remedial affirmative action, and diversity-based affirmative action cases, we show how the Court uses at least three verydifferent versions of strict scrutiny. The costs of maintaining the fiction of unitary strict scrutiny is high. In the area of racial profiling, for example, courts refuse to apply strict scrutiny for fear that it will either overly hamper police or will weaken strict scrutiny in other areas of racial discrimination. An open acknowledgment that the Court is already using different standards of analysis for different types of racial discrimination would allow courts to craft appropriate standards without fear of diminishing protections in other areas.


2017 ◽  
pp. 161-184
Author(s):  
Mark C. Jerng

This chapter discusses alternate histories of the Civil War in relation to U.S. Equal Protection jurisprudence and race discrimination law. It shows how the racial counterfactual shapes what counts as discrimination in an important anti-affirmative action legal case, Ricci v. Destefano. In particular, it analyzes the prominent use of racial counterfactuals by the Supreme Court justices in order to organize the perception of race. It then surveys alternate histories of the U.S. Civil War and describes their logics of narrative explanation. Finally, it turns to Terry Bissons’ Fire on the Mountain and Steven Barnes’s Lion’s Blood as examples of a strategic use of the racial counterfactual in order to envision different understandings of racial freedom and equality.


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