Reflective awareness, repression, and the cognitive unconscious.

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Boag
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 2635
Author(s):  
Marli Gonan Božac ◽  
Katarina Kostelić ◽  
Morena Paulišić ◽  
Charles G. Smith

The aim of this research was to examine partial reflective awareness in ethical business choices in Croatia. The ethical decision-making is interlinked with sustainable practices, but it is also its prerequisite. Thus, better understanding of business ethics decision-making provides a basis for designing and implementing sustainability in a corporate setting. The research was done on student populations who will soon carry important roles and make important decisions for individuals, organizations, and society. The field research was conducted using Kohlberg’s scenarios. The results reveal that the process of decision-making goes through the lenses of respondents’ own preferred ethics. However, the reflective awareness of respondents’ preferred ethics is skewed and regularities in that deviations point out to the relevance of the context characteristics and arousal factors. In addition, the individuals do not use all available information in the assessment process. The revealed partial reflective awareness contributes to explanation of why people have problems with justifying their choices. As there are many examples of unethical behavior in the environment that remain unpunished, it is necessary to raise awareness of the issue. Improvement in reflective awareness would contribute to more sustainable ethical choices and reveal a possibility of an intervention design within the higher education framework.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 147-169
Author(s):  
Taner Edis ◽  
Maarten Boudry

AbstractJudgments of the rationality of beliefs must take the costs of acquiring and possessing beliefs into consideration. In that case, certain false beliefs, especially those that are associated with the benefits of a cohesive community, can be seen to be useful for an agent and perhaps instrumentally rational to hold. A distinction should be made between excusable misbeliefs, which a rational agent should tolerate, and misbeliefs that are defensible in their own right because they confer benefits on the agent. Likely candidates for such misbeliefs are to be found in the realm of nationalism and religion, where the possession costs of true beliefs are high, and where collective beliefs in falsehoods may allow for a cohesive community. We discuss the paradoxes of reflective awareness involved in the idea of deliberately embracing falsehoods. More rigorous, fully reflective concepts of rationality would still disallow false beliefs, but such demanding versions of rationality would commit agents to pay large costs, thereby weakening the motivation for acquiring true beliefs.


1988 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-293
Author(s):  
Mario Rendon

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 962-964 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen LaBerge

Lucid dreaming provides a test case for theories of dreaming. For example, whether or not “loss of self-reflective awareness” is characteristic of dreaming, it is not necessary to dreaming. The fact that lucid dreamers can remember to perform predetermined actions and signal to the laboratory allows them to mark the exact time of particular dream events, allowing experiments to establish precise correlations between physiology and subjective reports, and enabling the methodical testing of hypotheses.[Hobson et al.; Solms]


Science ◽  
1987 ◽  
pp. 1638-1638
Author(s):  
J. S. KAFKA

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