Interview to the Journal Concept: philosophy, religion, culture. Interviewed by M. A. Khalil

This paper is an interview with Andrey V. Smirnov, Director of the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. The interview was dedicated to the broad set of issues that can all be characterized as relative to the umbrella topic of cultural patterns, the indispensability of cultural difference between nations and civilizations and the roots of such phenomena. Expressing the idea of specific mindsets and inherent value orientations, Andrey V. Smirnov adheres to the theoretical approach designed to underline these elements. The panhuman (vsechelovecheskoye) serves for these ends as well as the collective cognitive unconscious. The visions of panhuman oppose to the universalist paradigm (obshechelovecheskoye) and express concern about the drawbacks of cultural unification. Each culture shares one of these two approaches to a certain extent, and the viability of such cultures can be accessed with the view to the interests, goals and projects such cultures or nations nurture. All such phenomena stem from collective cognitive unconscious. Language as its signifier illustrates innate logical structures that also vary: while, for instance, the Arab thought runs on process-based logic that focuses on actions, European one represents substantial logic — that of the existential feeling. In this way all intercultural communication should take others’ visions and adopt to them, which is important not only for translators and interpreters, but also in the political sphere. Advocates of globalism and supranationalism are driven by ideas generated in the West and remain ignorant of the practices that are actually relevant in localities other than the USA or Western Europe. Many examples can be found in the societal shifts that Russia faces. The seemingly non-alternative modernisationalist initiatives that fall within the universalist liberal model are inadequate for the thought style and the corresponding institutional, authority and educational system. The most obvious examples of this deal with the digital sphere, but the cyber transformations as such are not imposing the universalist vision. Rather, it is the underlying culturally-rooted effects of the leverage the United States as the IT leader have and make use of. The questions on how these intercultural communications function now, what form should they take and the very transformations that burden self-sufficient cultures should be analyzed by philosophers. The realities of modern civilizations suggest that those who are set aside in the periphery raise voices and realize national subjectivity.

THE IDEA OF EMBODIED MIND AS SUBSTANTIATION OF CORPORAL RATIONALITY

The question of Post-Enlightenment rationality attracts attention of scientists in various fields of knowledge. Author believes that its justification should be strengthened by an appeal to corporal rationality. With understanding it as normative interactivity, the design of which is clearly dictated by the morphology of body and has an applied character, author believes that for its more thorough understanding, it is necessary to turn to the latest works of famous specialists in the field of semantic and cognitive linguistics, to J. Lakoff and M. Johnson. According to the idea of the corporeal mind, man is a creature that is subject to central nervous system. That is, person can only think about what mind / body is transmitting (the embodied mind). Based on reflections about emergence of metaphors, they conclude that human body determines a set of fundamental spatial relationships used not only in the process of self-orientation but also in the process of perception of spatial relationships between objects. The description of body and our views, understanding, complexity of thoughts are formed due to the system of mental images and motility. Body and sensorimotor system is a key component of the conceptual scheme. Thinking process itself takes place on the level of "cognitive unconscious" (this level of thinking process includes automatic cognitive operations, hidden knowledge, hidden beliefs etc.). Such "cognitive unconscious" produces conscious thinking without participation of consciousness. They assume that the source of categories are neural structures and bodily experience, and the terms of embodiment are used to form abstract concepts. Such "embodied abstract concepts" are the basis of thinking, which means that human thinking is also embodied. Thus the idea of embodied mind confirms the rejection of Cartesian dichotomy mind-body as anti-scientific, and any understanding of rationality must take into account corporal rationality.

The Impact of Unconscious Bias in Healthcare: How to Recognize and Mitigate It

The increasing diversity in the US population is reflected in the patients who healthcare professionals treat. Unfortunately, this diversity is not always represented by the demographic characteristics of healthcare professionals themselves. Patients from underrepresented groups in the United States can experience the effects of unintentional cognitive (unconscious) biases that derive from cultural stereotypes in ways that perpetuate health inequities. Unconscious bias can also affect healthcare professionals in many ways, including patient-clinician interactions, hiring and promotion, and their own interprofessional interactions. The strategies described in this article can help us recognize and mitigate unconscious bias and can help create an equitable environment in healthcare, including the field of infectious diseases.

The Cognitive Unconscious in Native American Embodied Knowing

In this paper, I address only one small parallel between one subsection of Western epistemology and cognitive theory and Native American epistemology. I draw the connection between the recent theories of embodied cognition and distinctive Native modes of embodied implicit procedural knowing, such as blood memory, vision questions, and non-binary logical systems. My reason for doing so is twofold. First, I show how these distinctive ways of knowing within Native worldviews are not mere mystical claims that can be cast aside in favor of more ostensibly “rational” knowing practices. To do so, I utilized Mark Johnson’s account of the cognitive unconscious to demonstrate how and that Native embodied knowing practices and knowledge sources are easily explicable when examined though a phenomenological cognitive lens. Second, I highlight one small respect in which Native epistemologies are conceived of procedurally. Embodied forms of knowing are merely one facet of the procedural performative nature of Native American epistemology but they are highly demonstrative of the fact that procedural ways of knowing—knowing-how—account for deeply implicit ways of knowing that are lacking from other procedural knowledge accounts that are often hamstrung without such an accompanying account of knowing-how beyond counterfactual knowledge.

Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity

Enactivists are searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity. Theory of mind approaches to social cognition have come a long way from folk psychological theorizing by paying more attention to neuroscientific evidence and phenomenological insights. This has led to hybrid accounts that incorporate automatic processing and allow an instrumental role for perception and interaction. However, two foundational assumptions remain unquestioned. First, the cognitive unconscious: explanations assume there is a privileged domain of subpersonal mechanisms that operate in terms of representational personal-level concepts (belief, desire, inference, pretense, etc.), albeit unconsciously. Second, methodological individualism: explanations of social capacities are limited to mechanisms contained within the individual. The enactive approach breaks free from these representationalist-internalist constraints by integrating personal-level phenomenology with multi-scale dynamics occurring within and between subjects. This formal and empirical research on social interaction supports the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity: we can directly participate in the unfolding of each other’s experience.