scholarly journals Biased belief updating and suboptimal choice in foraging decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Garrett ◽  
Nathaniel D. Daw
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Garrett ◽  
Nathaniel D. Daw

AbstractIn many choice scenarios, including prey, employment, and mate search, options are not encountered simultaneously and so cannot be directly compared. Deciding which ones optimally to engage, and which to forego, requires developing accurate beliefs about the overall distribution of prospects. However, the role of learning in this process – and how biases due to learning may affect choice – are poorly understood. In three experiments, we adapted a classic prey selection task from foraging theory to examine how individuals kept track of an environment’s reward rate and adjusted their choices in response to its fluctuations. In accord with qualitative predictions from optimal foraging models, participants adjusted their selectivity to the richness of the environment: becoming less selective in poorer environments and increasing acceptance of less profitable options. These preference shifts were observed not just in response to global (between block) manipulations of the offer distributions, but also to local, trial-by-trial offer variation within a block, suggesting an incremental learning rule. Further offering evidence into the learning process, these preference changes were more pronounced when the environment improved compared to when it deteriorated. All these observations were best explained by a trial-by-trial learning model in which participants estimate the overall reward rate, but with upward vs. downward changes controlled by separate learning rates. A failure to adjust expectations sufficiently when an environment becomes worse leads to suboptimal choices: options that are valuable given the environmental conditions are rejected in the false expectation that better options will materialize. These findings offer a previously unappreciated parallel in the serial choice setting of observations of asymmetric updating and resulting biased (often overoptimistic) estimates in other domains.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex O. Holcombe ◽  
Samuel J. Gershman

AbstractZwaan et al. and others discuss the importance of the inevitable differences between a replication experiment and the corresponding original experiment. But these discussions are not informed by a principled, quantitative framework for taking differences into account. Bayesian confirmation theory provides such a framework. It will not entirely solve the problem, but it will lead to new insights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Lukas Kirchner ◽  
Thomas Gärtner ◽  
Julia Anna Glombiewski

Abstract Background In two experimental studies, we tested the hypothesis that negative mood would hinder the revision of negative beliefs in response to unexpectedly positive information in depression, whereas positive mood was expected to enhance belief updating. Methods In study 1 (N = 101), we used a subclinical sample to compare the film-based induction of sad v. happy mood with a distraction control group. Subsequently, participants underwent a well-established paradigm to examine intra-individual changes in performance-related expectations after unexpectedly positive performance feedback. In study 2, we applied the belief-updating task from study 1 to an inpatient sample (N = 81) and induced sad v. happy mood via film-clips v. recall of autobiographic events. Results The results of study 1 showed no significant group differences in belief updating; the severity of depressive symptoms was a negative predictor of belief revision, though, and there was a non-significant trend suggesting that the presence of sad mood hindered belief updating in the subgroup of participants with a diagnosed depressive episode. Study 2 revealed that participants updated their expectations significantly less in line with positive feedback when they underwent the induction of negative mood prior to feedback, relative to positive mood. Conclusions By indicating that the presence of negative mood can hinder the revision of negative beliefs in clinically depressed people, our findings suggest that learning from new experiences can be hampered if state negative mood is activated. Thus, interventions relying on learning from novel positive experiences should aim at reducing state negative mood in depression.


Author(s):  
Ziqing Yao ◽  
Xuanyi Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu

Abstract When people are confronted with feedback that counters their prior beliefs, they preferentially rely on desirable rather than undesirable feedback in belief updating, i.e. an optimism bias. In two pre-registered EEG studies employing an adverse life event probability estimation task, we investigated the neurocognitive processes that support the formation and the change of optimism biases in immediate and 24 h delayed tests. We found that optimistic belief updating biases not only emerged immediately but also became significantly larger after 24 h, suggesting an active role of valence-dependent offline consolidation processes in the change of optimism biases. Participants also showed optimistic memory biases: they were less accurate in remembering undesirable than desirable feedback probabilities, with inferior memories of undesirable feedback associated with lower belief updating in the delayed test. Examining event-related brain potentials (ERPs) revealed that desirability of feedback biased initial encoding: desirable feedback elicited larger P300s than undesirable feedback, with larger P300 amplitudes predicting both higher belief updating and memory accuracies. These results suggest that desirability of feedback could bias both online and offline memory-related processes such as encoding and consolidation, with both processes contributing to the formation and change of optimism biases.


Author(s):  
Praveen Suthaharan ◽  
Erin J. Reed ◽  
Pantelis Leptourgos ◽  
Joshua G. Kenney ◽  
Stefan Uddenberg ◽  
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