Asymmetric Information Weighting in Belief Updating and the Effect on Mid-Sequence Evaluation

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gal Zauberman ◽  
Dan Ariely
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Belief Updating

Belief updating, debt pricing and financial decisions under asymmetric information

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruxing Xu ◽  
Shenghong Li
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Debt Pricing

Bayesian belief updating after a replication experiment

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex O. Holcombe ◽  
Samuel J. Gershman
Keyword(s):  
Confirmation Theory ◽  
Bayesian Confirmation Theory ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Original Experiment ◽  
Bayesian Confirmation ◽  
Replication Experiment

AbstractZwaan et al. and others discuss the importance of the inevitable differences between a replication experiment and the corresponding original experiment. But these discussions are not informed by a principled, quantitative framework for taking differences into account. Bayesian confirmation theory provides such a framework. It will not entirely solve the problem, but it will lead to new insights.

The influence of frequency learning on order effects in belief updating

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Krems ◽  
Martin Baumann
Keyword(s):  
Order Effects ◽  
Belief Updating

Strongly-handed Individuals are Less Gullible: Interhemispheric Interaction and Belief Updating

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen D. Christman ◽  
Bradley R. Henning ◽  
Ruth E. Propper
Keyword(s):  
Interhemispheric Interaction ◽  
Belief Updating

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Do Individual Investors Have Asymmetric Information Based on Work Experience?

CFA Digest ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 15-15
Author(s):  
Victoria J. Rati
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Work Experience ◽  
Individual Investors
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