Safety Processing Modeling of Train Location for High-Speed Maglev Operation Control System

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yijun Chen ◽  
Zhongwei Xu ◽  
Huahua Zhao ◽  
Zhangyang Li ◽  
Pengzi Chu
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijuan Shi ◽  
Jian Wang

Purpose This paper aims to study the reliability of the high-speed train operation control system in the Chinese Train Control System Level 3 (CTCS-3) operating mode. Design/methodology/approach Dynamic fault tree and Bayesian network method are adopted to analyze the reliability and weakness of the CTCS-3 system. Findings First, a physical architecture and data flow diagram of the CTCS-3 system are established according to the typical structure and functions of the CTCS-3 system. Second, the dynamic fault tree of the CTCS-3 system is constructed. Considering the prior probability of the bottom event and the existence of dynamic redundancy, the dynamic fault tree is transformed into a Bayesian net. The reliability of the CTCS-3 system is carried out based on the prior probability and the weakness that affects the reliability of the system based on the posterior probability is also analyzed by the Bayesian network. Finally, it is disclosed that the impact of the on-board subsystem on the reliability of the CTCS-3 system is generally greater than that of the ground subsystem. The two weakest modules in the onboard subsystem are the driver-machine interface (DMI) and balise transmission module (BTM) and the weakest one in the ground subsystem is Balise. The analysis results are generally consistent with the malfunctions in the field operation of China’s high-speed railway. Originality/value (1) By reasoning, the reliability of the train operation control system in the CTCS-3 operating mode meets the standard requirements. (2) Through backward reasoning, it is found that the failure of the onboard subsystem leads to a greater probability of failure of the train control system. (3) The DMI, BTM and automatic train protection computer unit modules are weak components in the onboard subsystem. Vital digit input&output, train interface unit and train security gateway are rarely involved in previous research, the result in this paper shows that these three modules are also weak components in the subsystem, which requires attention.


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