scholarly journals A New Proposal for Setting Intra-Company Transfer Prices

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (46) ◽  
pp. 97-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Manes ◽  
R. Verrecchia
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Gideon Goerdt ◽  
Wolfgang Eggert

AbstractThin capitalization rules limit firms’ ability to deduct internal interest payments from taxable income, thereby restricting debt shifting activities of multinational firms. Since multinational firms can limit their tax liability in several ways, regulation of debt shifting may have an impact on other profit shifting methods. We therefore provide a model in which a multinational firm can shift profits out of a host country by issuing internal debt from an entity located in a tax haven and by manipulating transfer prices on internal goods and services. The focus of this paper is the analysis of regulatory incentives, $$(i)$$ ( i ) if a multinational firm treats debt shifting and transfer pricing as substitutes or $$(ii)$$ ( i i ) if the methods are not directly connected. The results provide a new aspect for why hybrid thin capitalization rules are used. Our discussion in this paper explains why hybrid rules can result in improvements in welfare if multinational firms treat methods of profit shifting as substitutes.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
G.V. Satya Sekhar

When   there is a system of international financial reporting system (IFRS) is much in discussion, why the policy makers are not thinking for ICAN( International Common Assessment Number) in place of PAN (Permanent Assessment Number)as in the  in case of assessees in India.    In this situation, any individual’s income earned any where in the world can become  under a common tax planning tool.The government of India has agreements with most other nations that determine how multinational companies are taxed. In other words, the tax treaties attempt to avoid the double-taxation that would occur if two nations taxed the same income. Since transfer prices represent revenue to the upstream division and an expense to the downstream division, the transfer price affects the calculation of divisional profits that represent taxable income in the nations where the divisions are based. Further, double taxation avoidance agreements also helpful for monitoring and control of fraudulent affairs in the corporate world. In this context, this paper is intended to examine the significance of uniform assessment system in the entire world and need for common assessment number. 


Author(s):  
Canri Chan

This study investigated the effects of government regulations and incentives on the setting of transfer prices. I found significant main effects of both variables on transfer price choices. Transfer pricing is important, particularly for Multinational Corporations (MNCs), because of increased trends toward globalization of business activities and, simultaneously, decentralization. These trends have led to increased pressures for sound internal pricing systems, specifically transfer pricing, in order for organizations to ensure optimal and efficient allocations of organization resources and to provide profit performance measurements (Tang 1992). It has generally been recognized in the literature that in order to maximize after tax cash flows, MNCs shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. Governments in some countries, particularly those with high tax rates, are greatly concerned as to whether or not companies attempt to avoid tax liabilities via transfer pricing manipulation, specifically in terms of trying to shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions, and have enacted laws to limit transfer price choice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1122-1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus C. Arnold ◽  
Robert M. Gillenkirch ◽  
R. Lynn Hannan

Author(s):  
Sandy Arief ◽  
Supriyono Supriyono

Transfer price negotiations are important to managers as they influence both their own and other divisional profits. These transfer prices are affected by both economic factors (market prices) and behavioral factors including fairness on judgments about negotiated transfer prices. In the current study, we examine whether the impact of accounting information on managers’ transfer price expectations are affected by the way accounting information is framed (either as potential gains or potential losses) and the managers’ perception of the other negotiation partners’ objective (whether their partner’s objective involves high or lowconcern-for-others). These expectations are important as they directly affect the costs and outcomes of negotiations. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted to test the proposed hypotheses, using a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The participants of an experiment were 216 undergraduate accounting students from Faculty of Economics and Business, Soegijapranata Catholic University, Semarang. The results of this study that compared to the mainframe, a loss frame exacerbates managers’ self-serving bias and increases the transfer price expectation gap between buyers and sellers. Further, we found that the negotiation partner’s objective had a significant impact on sellers’ transfer price judgments. This finding also found that the degree of concern for the other party has a significant impact on the judgment, in particular, the transfer price for the seller division.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Lorenz ◽  
Caren Sureth-Sloane ◽  
Markus Diller

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Bouwens ◽  
Bert Steens

ABSTRACT Full-cost transfer pricing has been criticized for providing production units with insufficient incentives to economize. Our empirical study based on data from a large producer of consumer goods shows that charging full-cost transfer prices to downstream sales units can send upstream production units into a death spiral. However, our results also suggest that production units reduce costs to prevent the death spiral. We observe that managers focus their cost-cutting efforts on unit variable costs and on products with the best sales prospects. These results also suggest that, when production units are at risk of falling into a death spiral, full-cost transfer pricing can serve as a credible commitment device to motivate managers to reduce costs. JEL Classifications: D24; M31; M41; M50. Data Availability: We were given the opportunity to work with a company's proprietary database that contains sensitive and classified data that cannot be disclosed due to a non-disclosure agreement. At the start of our research, the company agreed to be referred to as Carepro, which is fictitious and does not correspond to any other existing company with that same or a similar name.


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