scholarly journals Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil

2019 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-333
Author(s):  
Luis R. G. Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Sceptical Theism

In defence of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy

2005 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann ◽  
Michael Rea
Keyword(s):  
Sceptical Theism

Sceptical theism and divine lies

2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIK J. WIELENBERG
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractIn this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or (b) the sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil fails. An implication of (a) is that sceptical theism is at odds with any religious tradition according to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely in virtue of the fact that God has told us that they are true. This result will render conceding (a) unattractive to many sceptical theists.

scholarly journals The Job's Dilemma: Fiat justitia, ruat caelum

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 95-115
Author(s):  
Paolo Gomarasca
Keyword(s):  
Book Of Job ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Failed Attempt ◽  
Sceptical Theism

The aim of the paper is to examine the problem of suffering in the book of Job and the possible solution it offers. For this reason, it is structured as follows: (I) In the first section, we will analyse Job’s evidential argument; (II) the second section will delve into the ‘friends’ and their failed attempt at a retributive theodicy; (III) finally, we shall look into God’s argument and try to explain Job’s answer in terms of sceptical theism.

Sceptical theism and moral scepticism

2007 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
IRA M. SCHNALL
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Effective Solution ◽  
Analogous Argument ◽  
Sceptical Theism ◽  
Moral Scepticism ◽  
Do So

Several theists have adopted a position known as ‘sceptical theism’, according to which God is justified in allowing suffering, but the justification is often beyond human comprehension. A problem for sceptical theism is that if there are unknown justifications for suffering, then we cannot know whether it is right for a human being to relieve suffering. After examining several proposed solutions to this problem, I conclude that one who is committed to a revealed religion has a simpler and more effective solution. In particular, according to traditional Judaism, God has permitted us, indeed commanded us, to relieve suffering, so we know that it is right for us to do so. I further show how God's command, according to Judaism, that we save lives provides an answer to an analogous argument put forward by David Hume. Thus, revealed theistic religions can sometimes solve problems more effectively than theism alone.

Sceptical theism and divine truths

2011 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
AARON SEGAL
Keyword(s):  
Word Of God ◽  
Sceptical Theism ◽  
Plausible Argument

AbstractSceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.

Sceptical Theism, the Butterfly Effect and Bracketing the Unknown

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 71-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss
Keyword(s):  
Butterfly Effect ◽  
Horrendous Evils ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractSceptical theism claims that we have vast ignorance about the realm of value and the connections, causal and modal, between goods and bads. This ignorance makes it reasonable for a theist to say that God has reasons beyond our ken for allowing the horrendous evils we observe. But if so, then does this not lead to moral paralysis when we need to prevent evils ourselves? For, for aught that we know, there are reasons beyond our ken for us to allow the evils, and so we should not prevent them. This paralysis argument, however, shall be argued to rest on a confusion between probabilities and expected utilities. A connection between this paralysis argument and Lenman's1 discussion of the butterfly effect and chaos will be drawn, and the solution offered will apply in both cases.

Egoism or the problem of evil: a dilemma for sceptical theism

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-325
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN T. RANCOURT
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractSceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in our decision-making. The first horn undermines theism, while the second undermines our moral decision-making. Thus, sceptical theism is problematic.

Descartes's sceptical theism

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-527
Author(s):  
THADDEUS S. ROBINSON
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractIn the first part of the article I show how Descartes employs the sceptical theist strategy as part of his response to the problem of evil in Meditation Four. However, Descartes's use of this strategy seems to raise a serious challenge to his whole project: if Descartes is ignorant of God's purposes, then how can he be sure that God doesn't have some morally sufficient reason for creating him with unreliable clear and distinct perceptions? Drawing on related objections from Mersenne and Hobbes, I show in the second half of the article how Descartes can sidestep this objection.

Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil

2003 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 496-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Almeida ◽  
Graham Oppy
Keyword(s):  
Sceptical Theism
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