The epistemic value of independent lies: false analogies and equivocations

Here I critically assess an argument put forward by Kuorikoski et al. (Br J Philos Sci, 61(3):541–567, 2010) for the epistemic import of model-based robustness analysis. I show that this argument is not sound since the sort of probabilistic independence on which it relies is unfeasible. By revising the notion of probabilistic independence imposed on the models’ results, I introduce a prima-facie more plausible argument. However, despite this prima-facie plausibility, I show that even this new argument is unsound in most if not all cases of model-based robustness analysis. This I do to demonstrate that the epistemic import of model-based robust analysis cannot be satisfactorily defended on the basis of probabilistic independence.

Justification under uncertainty

Belief formation and justification of belief is the subject of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. In this article we are mostly interested in the application of analytic techniques for the explication of belief justification under uncertainty. We need to explicate this phenomenon in order to answer, at least in part, the question of what are the features of reasoning made in conditions that cause doubts, how people make decisions in such conditions. Arguments used for the justification of such decisions have the status of plausible arguments. The crucial issues related to the analysis and evaluation of plausible arguments are of the acceptability of the premises and the transmission of their acceptability to the conclusion. In this article, we have focused on the transition from the premises to the conclusions of plausible arguments, on the transmission of justification of premises to the conclusions. To establish the peculiarities of such a transmission an outline of the semantics for such arguments is proposed. Its key component is the measures of the plausibility of the premises and rules of inference. A plausible argument itself does not provide the ultimate reason for accepting its conclusion. The justification of the conclusion also depends on other arguments that support or defeat it. So to establish the degree of justification of the conclusion we need to attribute the weights to the premises and rules of inference. We hope that this study provides at least a preliminary answer to the question of how the failure of the transmission of justification in plausible arguments differs from the failure of transmission in deductive arguments.

Transhumanism Without Mind Uploading and Immortality

Elon Musk regularly advertises for the simulation argument, stressing that he regards it as highly likely that we live in a computer simulation. However, it must be noted that the argument can be reconstructed such that its line of thought can be rationally grasped. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it is a plausible argument. The argument presupposes the anthropology that human beings can be uploaded onto a hard drive, which is based upon the view that humans are nothing like a software running on our body which serves as our hardware. It is this understanding of the human species which has been employed by many transhumanists who stress that immortality is near. The author will explain the line of thought underlining the simulation argument while they will, at the same time, explain that it is neither highly likely that we live in a computer simulation, nor that we can upload our personalities onto a computer, and even if this was possible, it would not enable us to become immortal.

The (In-)Validity of Turkey’s Reservation to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The aim of this article is to examine Turkey’s reservation to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) and to advance a plausible argument for its invalidity based upon the relevant secondary rules of international law.

Quantifying shape similarity between prey and uninteresting models to study animal masquerade

Masquerade occurs when an organism resembles an inedible or uninteresting object (model), such as a leaf, stick, or stone. The shapes of many species are described as similar to those of models in their microhabitats, but these similarities have not been quantified effectively. To describe the shape similarity between an animal and a model, we applied a shape description method in a field study of the four-eyed turtle (Sacalia quadriocellata). Our results showed that shape similarity between turtles and stones in the Hezonggou River was significantly higher midstream than that upstream and downstream. In line with these findings, masquerade efficiency was highest for turtles in the midstream area, with both inexperienced and experienced human ‘predators’. Masquerade efficiency was positively correlated with shape similarity in all stream sections. Shape similarity ranged from 0 to 1, with <0.65 indicating low masquerade efficiency and >0.80 indicating high masquerade efficiency. Our quantitative method was able to provide data that could be used to form an ecologically plausible argument; thus, shape similarity can be used to assess animal’s masquerade efficiency. This method will be of considerable use in future animal masquerade research.

Fist

This chapter discusses the guidelines for the needed federalism debate by outlining a sequence of evaluative questions that national policy-makers should consider before the passage of any national law that affects one or more of the three institutions of federalism: assignment as to who does what, the number of lower-tier governments, and representation of those governments to the national legislature. The proposed evaluation provides citizens with a Federalism Impact Statement, or FIST, for the proposed policy. As implemented, FIST begins with an analysis of the economic implications of each proposed central government policy by asking whether the national benefits of the policy outweigh its national costs, and whether there might be an alternative policy that is plausibly more efficient. If the proposed policy is viewed as inefficient, by itself or relative to alternative policies, then FIST asks whether there is evidence of, or plausible argument for, compensating benefits from improved local political participation, improved economic fairness, or increased protection of individual rights or liberties. If so, then FIST asks whether these noneconomic benefits can be achieved more efficiently. The execution of FIST would be by an independent agency, such as the Congressional Budget Office or the European Commission, while a national court could ensure that all relevant central government legislation acknowledge, though not necessarily accept, the content and conclusions of the FIST analysis.

Necrophilia

This chapter offers a discussion of necrophilia, an offense that has been almost completely ignored in the criminal law theory literature but that raises interesting moral and conceptual issues—about the limits of the harm and wrong principles and the problem of the so-called missing subject. After ruling out a harm to third parties rationale, it suggests that the most plausible argument for criminalizing necrophilia is that it causes harm to the deceased person whose corpse is mistreated. But does it make sense to say that a person can suffer harms or wrongs postmortem? The question has an ancient philosophical pedigree and remains contentious. The chapter argues that the wrong caused by necrophilia is not to the corpse as such but to the antemortem person the corpse once embodied, who had an interest in maintaining her sexual autonomy while she was still alive.

Lost in translation? Transferring creativity insights from arts into management

Since the early 2000s the business sector has, as a matter of both professional and academic concern, repeatedly advocated the transfer of artistic practices, especially those deemed exemplary forms of creativity, to a management world grappling with new challenges – a claim we here call the ‘transferability thesis’ in order to consider the responses made to what Boltanski and Chiapello define as an artistic critique of capitalism. Drawing on the wide range of relevant academic literature, this article critically examines the plausibility of the ‘thesis’. To this end, we review analytical literature advocating artistic transfers alongside empirical work that examines art interventions within organizations. Both are important components of a broader organizational aesthetics approach even though, we contend, neither strands of research provide a plausible argument for meaningful transferability. We then draw on arts-based literature, management theory and psychology to compare notions of creativity at both ends of the proposed transferral process. We highlight convergence and variance in art and business thinking, noting fundamental mismatches with regard to utility, rationalization and heteronomy – three levels of incompatibility that make a genuine transplantation of art ideas highly unlikely. Finally, we discuss our critical contribution in relation to the specious status of the ‘thesis’ and the centrality of Boltanski and Chiapello’s triadic model of capitalism to our investigation. By way of a conclusion, we suggest that further research is needed to examine the symbolic nature of appeals to artistic creativity by management.

SELF-OWNERSHIP AND AGENT-CENTERED OPTIONS

I argue that agent-centered options to favor and sacrifice one’s own interests are grounded in a particular aspect of self-ownership. Because you own your interests, you are entitled to a say over how they are used. That is, whether those interests count for or against some action is, at least in part, to be determined by your choice. This is not the only plausible argument for agent-centered options. But it has some virtues that other arguments lack.

Text or Intent, or Both

This chapter discusses a wide range of issues concerning how far text and intentions should figure in judicial interpretation of legal standards and what should constitute the relevant understanding of a text and the intentions of those who enact it. The chapter makes two fundamental points. The first is that intrinsically what a communications means is closely interrelated to the perceived intentions of those who make it. Any plausible argument for disregarding intentions must rest on claimed specific obstacles, not ordinary understandings. The second basic point is that how to understand text and intentions is sometimes simple, but when it comes to debatable situations each can be complicated and controversial. The chapter also looks at the practice of judicial deference to the interpretations of others and whether that is appropriate.