Evil and Divine Power: A Response to James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come. He suggests that this is the underlying element in discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, a doctrine that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion. Although, as hypothetical trolley cases demonstrate, human beings sometimes cannot avoid doing or permitting evil in order to prevent a greater evil, Sterba argues that the same cannot be said of an omnipotent God and that, since our world contains horrendous evils, the existence of a God who is both omnipotent and good is therefore logically impossible. I argue that, if God is thought to be a conscious being with unlimited power to prevent horrendous evils, Sterba’s argument might be valid. I also argue, however, that divine power need not be construed in this way. Drawing on some ideas derived from the work of Charles Hartshorne, I suggest that God is not a kind of divine micromanager and that it is more coherent and, indeed, helpful to think of God as a social influencer whose power is a source of positive energy for the promotion of goodness.

A Compensatory Response to the Problem of Evil

In this essay, I affirm the univocity thesis while discussing some alternative positions that avoid the problem of evil by rejecting the univocity thesis. I reject Sterba’s assumption that God’s governance of creation is adequately understood as an analogy to good governance of a politically liberal democracy. I suggest that Sterba’s commitment to the Pauline principle forces a dilemma between significant human freedom and meticulous divine intervention. Finally, I argue that the existence of horrendous evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God, given a compensatory response to the problem of evil.

On James Sterba’s Refutation of Theistic Arguments to Justify Suffering

In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion by invoking three moral requirements and by creating an analogy with how the just state would address such evils, while protecting significant freedoms and rights to which all are entitled. I respond that his argument has important ambiguities and that consistent application of his moral principles will require that God remove all moral and natural evils. This would deleteriously restrict not only human moral decision making, but also the knowledge necessary to make moral judgments. He replies to this critique by appealing to the possibility of limited divine intervention, to which I rejoin with reasons why his middle ground is not viable.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter takes a step back to consider the place of Non-Identity Theodicy in the contemporary theodicy literature. It recaps the key areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in contemporary theodicies. These misemphases include a failure to adequately appreciate the distinctive challenges that horrendous evils pose for the moral justification of harm; an overemphasis on the moral distinction between causing and permitting (especially where God is the agent in question); an overestimation of the moral significance of caretaker rights to cause or permit harm; an overemphasis on the role of free will in theodicy (resulting in a tendency towards anthropocentrism); and a questionable focus on general goods which manifests itself in a prioritizing of worlds over human persons, generic human persons over individual human persons, and all-things-considered benefit over more specific interests such as the aversion of serious harm. It is argued that Non-Identity Theodicy corrects for these various misemphases by conceiving of God first and foremost not as a creator of goods but as a lover of persons. This chapter ends by discussing how Non-Identity Theodicy can be combined with other theodicies in the formulation of a cumulative case theodicy.

Applying the Analogies: Permission and Risk; Benefit Production and Harm Avoidance

Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies theodicies that depict God as permitting horrendous evil for pure benefit, risking horrendous evil for pure benefit, and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of greater harm. Each theodicy is summarized and an evaluation is made as to whether it is structurally promising with respect to horrendous evils, where structural promise denotes that God is ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true. The conclusion drawn is that the theodicies depicting God as permitting horrendous evils for pure benefit are structurally deficient; they do not depict God as ethically perfect even if they are true. Structural promise is identified in theodicies that depict God as risking horrendous evil for pure benefit and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of harm. In the next chapter the plausibility of these structurally promising approaches is considered.

Non-Identity Theodicy

This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.

Applying the Analogies: Causing for Pure Benefits

Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies three theodicies that depict God as causing horrendous evils for pure benefit. This structural approach to theodicy is evaluated and a conclusion is drawn that pure benefits are incapable of justifying the causation of horrendous evils. It is argued that this approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. When moral constraints on the causing of horrors are considered and the justificatory asymmetry of harm-averting and non-harm-averting benefits brought to bear, pure benefit will not do the justificatory work (on its own) of securing God the status of an ethically perfect being.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.

Small Evils and Live Options

Many philosophers have thought that aggregates of small, broadly dispersed evils don’t pose the same sort of challenge to theism that horrendous evils like the Nazi Holocaust do. But there are interesting arguments that purport to show that large enough aggregates of small evils are morally and axiologically equivalent to horrendous evils. Herein lies an intriguing and overlooked strategy for defending theism. In short: small evils, or aggregates of such evils, don’t provide decisive evidence against theism; there’s no relevant difference between horrendous evils and aggregates of small evils; hence horrendous evils must not provide decisive evidence against theism, either.