AbstractAfter contrasting process philosophy's pantemporalism with the two other possibilities — nontemporalism and dualism — I argue the following points:The great negative virtue of J.T.Fraser's version of emergent dualism is that it explicitly brings out the paradoxes that must be faced if pantemporalism is denied. Its great positive virtue,especially when read in conjunction with Grünbaum's position, is that it brings out the fact that time (in the full-fledged sense) requires experience.These two virtues combined suggest the truth of both pantemporalism and panexperientialism, which are mutually implicatory.Pantemporalism, or even the weaker conviction, shared by almost everyone, that time has existed at least since the origin of our universe, conflicts with another belief that initially seems equally well grounded — the belief in an ontological dualism between experiencing and nonexperiencing things. But this latter conviction belongs at best only to soft-core, not hard-core, common sense, so it can be given up without selfcontradiction. Because panexperientialism, like pantemporalism, solves a host of philosophical problems, a pantemporalisticpanexperientialist worldview can be defended in terms of selfconsistency and adequacy to the facts, including the facts of hard-core common sense.
FPGA multi-core processors power consumption: soft- core vs. hard-core
