LOYAL TO THE GAME? STRATEGIC POLICY REPRESENTATION IN MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Bernauer ◽  
Simon Munzert
2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172097833
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti

In recent years, a number of political theorists have aimed to restore the central role of parties in democratic life. These theorists have especially highlighted two key normative functions of parties: linkage and public justification. In this article, I argue that these two functions are often in tension. First, I illustrate how this tension manifests itself in liberal democracies. Second, I explain that parties’ ability to fulfil each of the two functions is strongly affected by the electoral system under which they operate: while first-past-the-post encourages party linkage but hinders public justification, the opposite is true of proportional representation. Third, I argue that a mixed electoral system can best guarantee the balance between parties’ linkage and justificatory functions. Fourth, I suggest a number of proposals for party reforms that could help mixed electoral systems to balance party linkage and public justification while preventing the re-emergence of the tension between them within parties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-268
Author(s):  
JUNGSUB SHIN

AbstractPerformance-based retrospective voting is a fundamental mechanism of democracy. A good deal of scholarship has examined this electoral mechanism, but the extant studies have two omissions. First, there is little research that considers several retrospective evaluations together using an incumbent voting model. Second, there is little research that examines the difference in the effects of voters’ retrospective evaluations on two different ballots in mixed electoral systems. To fill these omissions, this article tests a comprehensive retrospective performance voting model in a mixed electoral system. Specifically, this article examines the effects of voters’ retrospective economic evaluations of economic performance at the national and personal levels, human rights, corruption, welfare protection, and foreign policy on vote choice for the incumbent party in the 2016 Korean legislative election in which voters had two ballots: one for the party list vote and one for the district vote. By using multinomial logistic regression models, this article finds that among the six retrospective evaluation categories, judgments of national economic performance at the national level, human rights, and foreign policy have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party in party list vote choice, whereas only voters’ evaluation of foreign policy matter in the district level vote decision. The results imply that Korean voters consider various aspects of government performance, such as the conditions of human rights and relationships with other countries, rather than just focusing on the economy. The retrospective voting behavior of Korean voters differs between party list and district level ballots.


Author(s):  
Sören Holmberg

Institutional learning works. Citizens in older and more mature democracies feel represented to a larger extent than people in new and emerging democracies. And as normatively expected, feelings of being represented are reasonably well spread across different social and political groups. Electoral system design turns out not to be consequential. Majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral systems do about equally well when it comes to how well people feel they are being represented by a party or a party leader. The results are based on data from The Comparative Study of Electoral System’s (CSES) project covering forty-six countries and eighty-six elections between 2001 and 2011.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-67
Author(s):  
Peter Bence Stumpf

This article aims to examine strategic split-voting in mixed systems by analyzing the results of elections in three countries using mixed electoral systems—Germany, Hungary, and Lithuania—to further improve researchers' understanding of the relationship between strategic voting and ticket splitting. This is achieved by exploring new quantitative measures. The three selected countries do not use identical electoral systems, but their common characteristic is that they provide an opportunity for voters to split their ballot between an individual candidate running in a single-member constituency and a party list. This makes it possible to compare the two different types of votes and to search for patterns indicating strategic behavior. In this article, the authors introduce two analytic tools: one for determining the approximate quantity of split ballots and another for measuring strategic voting patterns based on the concentration of split tickets.


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