The Constitutive A Priori

1992 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 179-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graciela De Pierris
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
A Priori ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Privileged Position ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Structure Of Knowledge

The modem rationalist tradition initiated by Descartes has as one of its central tenets the independence of the human understanding from the senses. Regardless of the different ways in which independence from experience is understood, there is much common ground among the modem views on the a priori. Yet Kant, culminating this tradition, introduces an entirely new conception of the a priori never before articulated in the history of philosophy. This is the notion of elements in knowledge which are independent of experience but nevertheless closely connected, in a special way, with experience.Although for Kant the a priori has a privileged position in the structure of knowledge - as it has for other modem rationalist philosophers - one of the most striking, and often neglected, aspect of his conception of the a priori is the great extent to which it is opposed to foundationalism.

scholarly journals McTaggart’s paradox and its consequences

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-242
Author(s):  
Strahinja Djordjevic
Keyword(s):  
Time Series ◽  
21St Century ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Temporal Relations ◽  
Philosophy Of Time ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Contrary View ◽  
History Of ◽  
Mctaggart's Paradox

McTaggart?s explanation of the human understanding of time, which uses the time series, is a significant moment in the history of philosophy, and his attempt to prove time?s unreality had strong but diverse reactions. The majority of thinkers who wrote after him agree that time is indeed real, but the intellectual division that was created around the question of which part of the paradox in dispute will dominate philosophy of time in the 20th and 21st century. It can be concluded that both major theories within this field have an undeniable influence on the division of time series which McTaggart made. After analyzing the paradox, the focus will be on clarifying the debate between tensed and tenseless theorists. The former dispute the claim that the A-series is contradictory and argue that the tensed time is the proper determination of events in time, while the latter claim that the B-series is independent and that time can be determined only by temporal relations. By recognizing the differences between these two lines of thought, it will become easier to understand the nature of their relationship to the time series, namely by considering the ways in which they defend their own and attack the contrary view.

The Truth in Modalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 145-191
Author(s):  
Sanford Shieh
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Interesting Consequence ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
History Of

This chapter takes up two further issues about Frege’s attitude towards modality. First, Frege doesn’t simply reject the relativization of truth. He gives amodalist explanations of linguistic phenomena that seem to show that truth is relative to time, and of talk of truth in various circumstances. Second, Frege’s truth-absolutism is not incompatible with two analyses of modality prominent in the history of philosophy: in terms of a priori knowledge and in terms of analytic truth. But Frege construes apriority and analyticity in logical terms. Thus, ultimately, Frege’s view is that if there are any modal distinctions, they amount to nothing more than logical distinctions. An interesting consequence of Frege’s accounts of apriority, analyticity, and modality is that they allow not only for synthetic a priori truths, but also necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths.

The New Academy's Appeals to the Presocratics

Phronesis ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Palmer ◽  
Charles Brittain
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Precise Nature ◽  
Progressive Development ◽  
History Of ◽  
General Lesson ◽  
The Senses

AbstractMembers of the New Academy presented their sceptical position as the culmination of a progressive development in the history of philosophy, which began when certain Presocratics started to reflect on the epistemic status of their theoretical claims concerning the natures of things. The Academics' dogmatic opponents accused them of misrepresenting the early philosophers in an illegitimate attempt to claim respectable precedents for their dangerous position. The ensuing debate over the extent to which some form of scepticism might properly be attributed to the Presocratics is reflected in various passages in Cicero's Academica. In this essay, we try to get clearer about the precise nature of the Academics' historical claim and their view of the general lesson to be learned from reflection on the history of philosophy down to their own time. The Academics saw the Presocratics as providing some kind of support for the thesis that things are non-cognitive, or, more specifically, that neither the senses nor reason furnishes a criterion of truth. As this view is susceptible to both 'dialectical' and non-dialectical readings, we consider the prospects for each. We also examine the evidence for the varied functions both of the Academics' specific appeals to individual Presocratics and of their collections of the Presocratics' divergent opinions. What emerges is a better understanding of why the Academics were concerned with claiming the Presocratics as sceptical ancestors and of the precise manner in which they advanced this claim.

scholarly journals Of which we cannot speak … Philosophy and the humanities

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
David N. Rodowick
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
History Of Analytic Philosophy ◽  
History Of

Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften finden in Bezug auf Theorie kaum eine gemeinsame Gesprächsgrundlage. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass der späte Wittgenstein ebenfalls »Theorie« hinterfragt, dies aber als eine Weise begreift, den Dialog zwischen Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaft wiederherzustellen. Wittgenstein zielt in seinen Philosophischen Untersuchungen nicht – wie in der Analytischen Philosophie üblich – auf Gewissheit, sondern sucht Wege, die Philosophie zu Fragen des menschlichen Verstehens und Interpretierens zurückzuführen. </br></br>Philosophy and the humanities have not found much common ground for conversation in theory. I argue that the late Wittgenstein also questions »theory« but as a way of restoring a dialogue between philosophy and the humanities. Wittgenstein aimed his not at the quest for certainty, so characteristic of the history of analytic philosophy, but rather at ways for returning philosophy to questions of human understanding and interpretation through ethical questioning.

scholarly journals MARKSISTINĖ FILOSOFIJOS ISTORIOGRAFIJA LIETUVOJE: HORIZONTALUSIS REDUKCIONIZMAS

Problemos ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 31-42
Author(s):  
Gintaras Kabelka
Keyword(s):  
Reliable Method ◽  
A Priori ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Conceptual Apparatus ◽  
Theoretical Position ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject

Straipsnyje nagrinėjami Lietuvos filosofijos istoriografijos marksistinės metodologijos darbai, kuriems būdingas vadinamasis horizontalusis redukcionizmas. Eksplikuojama Lietuvos marksistinės filosofijos istoriografijos veikalų metodologinė struktūra, parodomas jiems būdingo vadinamojo aiškinimo solipsizmonevienodas laipsnis. Analizuojami filosofijos raidos marksistiniai vaizdiniai, teigiama, kad jie pagrįsti progreso idėja. Nagrinėjamas Eugenijaus Meškausko teorinių principų poveikis filosofijos istorijostyrimams Lietuvoje (Juozo Mureikos, Albino Lozuraičio darbai), kuris pasireiškia marksizmo kaip tam tikro problemų sprendimo būdo traktuote bei filosofijos dėsningo vystymosi sampratos plėtote. Apžvelgiamipaties marksizmo istorijos tyrinėjimai.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: filosofijos istoriografija, marksizmas, horizontalusis redukcionizmas.Marxist Historiography of Philosophy in Lithuania: Horizontal ReductionismGintaras Kabelka SummaryThe article analyzes the Marxist methodology of historiography of philosophy in Lithuania. The so-called interpretative solipsism is characteristic of the horizontal reductionism. It enforces the conceptual apparatus of its own theoretical position upon the subject of research, without considering whether the terms of that apparatus have something in common with the content of the subject. There are different degrees of interpretative solipsism in the Lithuanian history of philosophy. Zaksas is a priori convinced that his own theory is impeccable and that the subject of inquiry is undoubtedly fallacious and theoretically worthless. Balčius and Griška pay more attention to the description of the subject of inquiry. They rely on the materialistic, atheistic and scientist aspects of Marxism. Lozuraitis and Mureika regard Marxism as quite a reliable method of solving some theoretical problems. Their approach is akin to the methodology of the history of problems.Keywords: historiography of philosophy, Marxism, horizontal reductionism.sp;

Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Philosophy Of Perception ◽  
Initial Effort ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Senses ◽  
High Level ◽  
Naive Realist

Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by extremely polarized debates. The polarization is particularly acute in the debate between naïve realist disjunctivists and their opponents, but divisions seem almost as stark in other areas of dispute (for example, the debate over whether we experience so-called ‘high-level’ properties, and the debate concerning individuation of the senses). The guiding hypothesis underlying this volume is that such polarization stems from insufficient attention to how we should go about settling these debates. In general, there is widespread, largely implicit disagreement concerning what philosophical theories of perception are supposed to explain, the claims that we should hold fixed in the course of theorizing, and the methods that such theorizing should employ. The goal of this volume is to move such methodological questions from the background to the fore, in the hope of facilitating progress. The contributions constitute an initial effort to spur more explicit, systematic discussion of methodology in philosophy of perception. They cover a wide range of relevant topics, from the relation between scientific and philosophical theorizing about perception, to lessons we can learn from the history of philosophy of perception.

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