Causal Overdetermination and Kim’s Exclusion Argument

Philosophia ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 809-826 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Roche
2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baumgartner

One of the central objectives Shapiro and Sober pursue in (2007) is to show that what they call the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is a type of causal exclusion argument, fails. Epiphe nomenalism, according to the terminology adopted in (Shapiro and Sober 2007), designates the thesis that supervening macro properties (or variables or factors) have no causal influence on micro proper ties that are caused by the micro supervenience bases of those macro properties. Well-known classical exclusion arguments are designed to yield such macro-tomicro epiphenomenalism along the lines of the following reasoning: subject to the widely accepted principle of the causal closure of the physical, there exists a causally sufficient micro cause for every micro effect; if it is additionally assumed that macro properties supervene on micro properties without being identical (or reducible) to the latter and if — in light of the rareness of cases of causal overdetermination — micro effects are assumed not to be systematically overdetermined, it follows that macro properties are causally inert with respect to effects of their micro supervenience bases.


Metaphysica ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Esfeld

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-81
Author(s):  
Hagit Benbaji

The argument from causal overdetermination (‘the CO-argument’) is considered to be the shortest route to token monism. It only assumes that:1.Efficacy: Mental events are causes of physical events.2.Closure: Every physical event has a sufficient physical cause (if it has any sufficient cause).3.Exclusion: Systematic Causal Overdetermination (CO) is impossible: if an event x is a sufficient cause of an event y then no event x* distinct from x is a cause of y.4.Identity: Therefore, mental events are physical events.Exclusion does not deny the possibility of two gunmen that fi re at a victim at the same time. But event-dualism is like a systematic fi ringsquad case — whenever I want to raise my arm, my arm is raised, and that is intolerable.


Philosophia ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 1111-1131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin W. Sharpe

2002 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Funkhouser

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Walter

Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical events unless mental causation is a genuine case of overdetermination or mental properties are straightforwardly reducible to physical properties.


1977 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-214
Author(s):  
Louis E. Loeb

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