Historical Exceptionalism in International Law: Canada's Strategic Use of Law in the Arctic Ocean

Author(s):  
Justin D. Nankivell ◽  
Daniel K. Inouye
Politik ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Jacobsen ◽  
Jeppe Strandsbjerg

By signing the Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008, the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean pre-emptively desecuritized potential geopolitical controversies in the Arctic Ocean by confirming that international law and geo-science are the defining factors underlying the future delimitation. This happened in response to a rising securitization discourse fueled by commentators and the media in the wake of the 2007 Russian flag planting on the geographical North Pole seabed, which also triggered harder interstate rhetoric and dramatic headlines. This case, however, challenges some established conventions within securitization theory. It was state elites that initiated desecuritization and they did so by shifting issues in danger of being securitized from security to other techniques of government. Contrary to the democratic ethos of the theory, these shifts do not necessarily represent more democratic procedures. Instead, each of these techniques are populated by their own experts and technocrats operating according to logics of right (law) and accuracy (science). While shifting techniques of government might diminish the danger of securitized relations between states, the shift generates a displacement of controversy. Within international law we have seen controversy over its ontological foundations and within science we have seen controversy over standards of science. Each of these are amplified and take a particularly political significance when an issue is securitized via relocation to another technique. While the Ilulissat Declaration has been successful in minimizing the horizontal conflict potential between states it has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other.


2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-189
Author(s):  
Claudia Cinelli

Unique geographical and physical specificities characterize the Arctic as an extreme and fragile marine environment. Arctic specificities differ from those of any other environment in relation to which most general principles of international law have developed. International law is usually related to the regulation of the physical environment including the distinct issues of soil, water and the atmosphere rather than a combination of these components, as is the case in the ice-covered marine areas such as those composing most of the Arctic Ocean. From both historical and contemporary perspectives, the ‘Arctic question’ has typically been: does the presence of ice change the legal status of the Arctic Ocean? The answer is decidedly no. The so-called Arctic exception, relating to Article 234 UNCLOS, is clearly the exception that proves the rule. This study focuses on how both the sovereignty-based approach and the general interest approach each address the dynamic evolution of Arctic marine environmental challenges in line with UNCLOS, the “Constitution for the Oceans”. This, however, does not preclude the special conditions of the Arctic environment being factored in when Arctic and non-Arctic entities seek feasible ad hoc solutions for cooperation on common interests and concerns.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachael Lorna Johnstone

As the Arctic Ocean opens up to industrial development, the duties of States to protect the North’s vulnerable ecosystems become increasingly important. However, in the event that a State governing hydrocarbon operations in the Arctic Ocean does not exercise due diligence, it is far from clear which States, if any, can invoke responsibility and seek appropriate remedies. In the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, the International Law Commission entrenched a dichotomy between injured States and other States: a State cannot be considered to have a relevant legal interest on the simple basis that another State has violated a norm to which both are party. States which are not directly affected by a violation can only invoke responsibility for limited categories of norms: obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes. Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as in light of customary law, States have obligations to protect all of the marine environment, not just those maritime zones under the jurisdiction of other States. This includes a duty to protect the environment of the State’s own EEZ as well as the EEZ of other States and the High Seas. However, hydrocarbon developments in the Arctic Ocean can potentially violate these norms without creating an injured State. In the absence of an injured States, the question arises as to who might invoke responsibility for such wrongful conduct. In other words, are the norms at stake erga omnes or erga omnes partes? This paper will focus on this gap in the knowledge by setting out the criteria for a norm to have the status erga omnes or erga omnes partes and will argue that recent developments in international law indicate that norms to protect the marine environment have this character.


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