Discrete Resource Allocation with Non-Decreasing Return and Cost Functions

1983 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
K.M Mjelde
2019 ◽  
Vol 07 (10) ◽  
pp. 14-20
Author(s):  
Mehdi Tarhani ◽  
Sanjib Sarkar ◽  
Morad Khosravi Eghbal ◽  
Mehdi Shadaram

Mathematics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grigory Belyavsky ◽  
Natalya Danilova ◽  
Guennady Ougolnitsky

This paper considers resource allocation among producers (agents) in the case where the Principal knows nothing about their cost functions while the agents have Markovian awareness about his/her strategies. We use a dynamic setup of the stochastic inverse Stackelberg game as the model. We suggest an algorithm for solving this game based on Q-learning. The associated Bellman equations contain functions of one variable for the Principal and also for the agents. The new results are illustrated by numerical examples.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ye Chen ◽  
Nikola Marković ◽  
Ilya O. Ryzhov ◽  
Paul Schonfeld

Using Data to Allocate Resources Efficiently In city logistics systems, a fleet of vehicles is divided between service regions that function autonomously. Each region finds optimal routes for its own fleet and incurs costs accordingly. More vehicles lead to lower costs, but the trade-off is that fewer vehicles are left for other regions. Costs are difficult to quantify precisely because of demand uncertainty but can be estimated using data. The paper “Data-driven robust resource allocation with monotonic cost functions” by Chen, Marković, Ryzhov, and Schonfeld develops a principled risk-averse approach for two-stage resource allocation. The authors propose a new uncertainty model for decreasing cost functions and show how it can be leveraged to efficiently find resource allocations that demonstrably reduce the frequency of high-cost scenarios. This framework combines statistics and optimization in a novel way and is applicable to a general class of resource allocation problems, encompassing facility location, vehicle routing, and discrete-event simulation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (12) ◽  
pp. 1606-1612
Author(s):  
Gabriela B. Gomez ◽  
Don L. Mudzengi ◽  
Fiammetta Bozzani ◽  
Nicholas A. Menzies ◽  
Anna Vassall

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Malhotra

AbstractAlthough Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) cataloguing of and evolutionary explanations for folk-economic beliefs is important and valuable, the authors fail to connect their theories to existing explanations for why people do not think like economists. For instance, people often have moral intuitions akin to principles of fairness and justice that conflict with utilitarian approaches to resource allocation.


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