Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

<p>The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model.</p>

An Automated Geometric Appraisal Model

The idea of the circular economy is gaining steam in academia through the green economics of human resources policies in Asia. A high performance model delivers superior outcomes but does not deter praiseworthy professors from biased human interference. Using the computerized-based geometric performance base incentive model (CGPBI) is particularly beneficial in encouraging faculty who have achieved superior outcomes in all areas of science, academia, and other contributions. To fill this gap, the author proposed a geometric hybrid reward policy model that includes a number of fictitious variables such as topic tolerance, the effects of subject matter, and the average outcome across all subjects. This model uses Python to construct a standardized framework to gather data on the success of faculty. It provides a robust indication of comparative success and motivates workers to achieve more transparent performance outcomes. The author proposes the use of a multi-source assessment (MSA) to evaluate the faculty's annual results.

Research on the Tournament Incentive Mechanism of the Safety Behavior for Construction Workers: Considering Multiple Heterogeneity

The unsafe behavior of construction workers is one of the most important and direct causes of safety accidents. Managers usually develop effective incentives aimed at regulating worker safety behavior. Due to the large number of workers in construction projects, there are multiple differences in fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, which will lead to the complex effect of the traditional mechanism to regulate workers’ safety behavior. In order to improve the effectiveness of incentive measures for worker safety behavior, this paper takes into account the multiple differences of individual workers’ fairness preference, risk preference and ability level, based on the tournament mechanism to construct a competition incentive model. By designing a tournament reward and salary distribution for heterogeneous workers, the occurrence of unsafe behaviors can be reduced. The study found that in terms of the optimal level of safety investment, workers with risk aversion attitude generally invest higher than that of workers with risk preference, no matter whether they have a strong fairness preference or not; In terms of the distribution of tournament rewards, workers with a risk aversion attitude and a higher level of fairness preference need to be given higher incentives.

Compensation incentive contract of the subject librarians based on the H-M model

Based on the H-M model, the compensation incentive model is constructed under the inter-task cost function. The best compensation incentive contract is constructed by solving the incentive model, and the incentive characteristics are analysed. The results show that the best incentive intensity decreases as the subject service selectivity increases. The higher incentive intensity of university managers for specific tasks, the lower efforts of subject librarians for another specific task. Moreover, when the tasks are substituted for each other, the profit-sharing ratios corresponding to different tasks are complementary. Finally, we establish the econometric empirical models to test these results.

Incentive Mechanism for Product Quality of Retailers Based on Platform-Based ECommerce

In order to explore the autonomous incentive mechanism of platform-based e-commerce to online retailers' products, a product quality incentive model based on deposit and commission management is established for single retailer single quality products, single retailer products at multiple quality levels and double-retailer different quality products in three cases. Comparative analysis of the equilibrium results in three cases reveals that the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism of platform discount in the first case depends on the deposit strategy of the platform and the influence of the unit cost of excellent and low-quality products. In the second case, the incentive mechanism of platform discount is completely effective. The platform price discount has a positive incentive effect on retailers. The online retailers' increasing the sales of high-quality products and reducing the sales of low-quality products improve the high-quality product rate in the market. In the third case, the effectiveness of the platform discount incentive mechanism is mainly affected by the unit cost of products.

Designing two-period decentralized service chain incentives with the consideration of customer acquisition and retention

PurposeThe authors address a two-dimensional (both customer acquisition and retention) incentive in a decentralized service chain consisting of a risk-neutral brand and agent (or averse). Design/methodology/approachThe authors focus on the relationship between acquisition and retention, that is, retained customers (repeated purchases) are based on and come from the acquired (new) customers in the former period. The authors also design a two-period separate incentive on both dimensions.FindingsThe authors found that a targeted incentive strategy should be applied for achieving more revenue when the incentive intensities are relatively small. Otherwise, the brand needs to adjust the targeted incentive strategy into incentivizing the opposite dimension, particularly on acquisition. Under the optimal contract, the brand needs to be very careful with deciding the fixed part of the incentive salary and the incentive intensities on both dimensions. For example, the fixed salary initially decreases and then increases in the incentive intensities. For the optimal incentive policies, the brand should incentivize acquisition but outsource retention if the agent is risk-neutral. When the agent is becoming risk-averse, the brand should lower its incentive intensity as the risk degree and variances become larger. Interestingly, the brand may benefit from introducing risks.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the literature by considering the following points. First, the authors extend the principal-agent incentive model by considering two-period decisions of customer acquisition and retention. Second, based on the two-period principal-agent problem, the authors design separate incentive intensities on acquisition and retention, respectively. While, most of the literature focused on acquisition incentives. Third, different from other works focusing on either risk-neutral or risk-averse environments, the authors consider both and compare the cases of risk-neutral and risk-averse to analyze the impact of risk on the optimal decisions and the brand's expected profit.

Research on the Knowledge-Sharing Incentive of the Cross-Boundary Alliance Symbiotic System

The rise of the cross-boundary alliance as a new organizational model profoundly affects innovation development. The incentive mode of knowledge-sharing among cross-boundary alliance members from the perspective of symbiosis is the key to improving the efficiency of knowledge-sharing and promoting the alliance’s sustainable development. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of knowledge and information asymmetry among alliance members, knowledge-sharing is prone to opportunistic behavior, which greatly impacts cross- boundary innovation cooperation. The symbiotic system of the cross-boundary alliance is constructed based on the analysis of symbiosis among alliance members to solve these problems. In this research study, the principal–agent theory is used to describe the expected benefits and the related constraints of knowledge-sharing partners. Moreover, an incentive model of knowledge-sharing in the cross-boundary alliance is established. By solving the model, the agent’s sharing intention and the principal’s reward incentive coefficient are obtained, which provide a theoretical basis for the formulation of the optimal incentive scheme of knowledge-sharing in the alliance. The results show that the knowledge potential difference, knowledge transmission efficiency, knowledge transformation, innovation effort, and the symbiotic environment will directly affect the knowledge transfer level of the alliance. In this research study, a theoretical research framework of the cross-boundary alliance symbiotic system linked by knowledge-sharing is constructed. The incentive model of knowledge-sharing is established especially on the basis of fully considering the internal and external factors of knowledge-sharing. This research study has provided some innovation in the theoretical system and method improvement, and has guaranteed the efficient integration, utilization, and innovation of knowledge resources in the cross-boundary alliance.

Information Acquisition Incentive Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes a new information acquisition mechanism for intelligent mine construction, which solves the problem of incomplete information acquisition in the construction of new intelligent mining area and reduces the difficulty of information acquisition, which solves the problem of the imperfect mine information acquisition in the construction of a new smart mine regions and decreases the difficulty of a mine information acquisition. Based on the evolutionary game model, the perceptual incentive model based on group is established. The reliability of information collection is ensured by sharing and modifying the information collector. Through the analysis of the simulation results, it is found that the regional coverage model based on the cooperation in game theory and evolutionary game theory has a good effect on solving the bottleneck problem of the current intelligent mining area. This paper has an enlightening effect on the optimization of the mine information acquisition system. Through the improvement of the mine information acquisition system, the working efficiency of the information acquisition terminal can be effectively increased by 6%.

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of the Pension Service Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

The information asymmetry between the pension service integrator and the pension service providers will affect the efficiency of the whole supply chain, and information sharing can solve this problem to a certain extent. To achieve information sharing, mutual trust is the first condition and mutual trust is also one of the important means of endogenous incentives. In this paper, the trust incentive coefficient is embedded in the principal-agent model. Considering the service capability coefficient, the communication degree coefficient, and the information sharing degree coefficient of the pension service providers, the trust incentive model of the supply chain of the pension service is constructed, the model is solved, and the conclusion is drawn. Finally, the correctness of the conclusion is verified by the numerical simulation using SAS software. The final results show that, under the condition of information asymmetry, the trust incentive coefficient of the pension service integrator to the pension service providers is positively correlated with the effort coefficient, the service capability coefficient, the communication coefficient, and the information sharing degree coefficient of the pension service providers, while it is positively correlated with the effort cost coefficient, the output sharing coefficient, and the risk aversion coefficient of the pension service providers. The variance of number and external environmental variables is negatively correlated. This research has shown that the trust is a means of incentive for pension service providers to share information. This research has a certain practical significance for improving the service efficiency of the pension services supply chain and optimizing the level of pension services.