A comparison of cognitive restructuring and cognitive defusion as strategies for resisting a craved food

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (sup2) ◽  
pp. 74-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robyn Moffitt ◽  
Grant Brinkworth ◽  
Manny Noakes ◽  
Philip Mohr
2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 218-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett J. Deacon ◽  
Tamer I. Fawzy ◽  
James J. Lickel ◽  
Kate B. Wolitzky-Taylor

Within traditional cognitive therapy, cognitive restructuring is often used to challenge the veracity of dysfunctional thoughts. In contrast, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) uses “cognitive defusion” techniques to change the function of negative thoughts rather than modify their content. Previous research has shown that a cognitive defusion technique known as the “milk exercise” (rapidly repeating a self-referential, one-word thought such as “fat”) reduces the discomfort and believability associated with negative thoughts. This study sought to replicate and extend these findings by comparing the impact of cognitive defusion with that of cognitive restructuring in a sample of participants distressed by negative thoughts about their body shape. Participants received a detailed rationale and training followed by instructions to practice the assigned technique as homework for 1 week. Results indicated that both cognitive techniques produced substantial improvements that generalized well beyond the specific thoughts targeted for treatment. Clear differences in treatment process and the course of improvement were evident. Findings are discussed in the context of theoretical and practical similarities and differences between these two approaches.


Author(s):  
Joseph Lavelle ◽  
Neil Dunne ◽  
Hugh E. Mulcahy ◽  
Louise McHugh

AbstractConversational agents or chatbots are a novel, highly accessible, and low-resource method of psychological intervention delivery. The present research aims to compare two brief chatbot interventions that delivered cognitive restructuring and defusion interventions, respectively. It was hypothesized that a defusion chatbot would lead to reduced cognitive fusion and decreased thought believability relative to cognitive restructuring and a nonactive control. Participants (N = 223; M age of 28.01 [SD = 10.29]; 47 identified as male, 174 as female, and 2 as nonbinary) were randomized into one of three conditions (defusion, restructuring, control), engaged for 5 days completing thought and mood measures pre- and postintervention. Sixty-two participants (M age of 25.98; SD = 8.647 years) completed measures again at time 2 (49 identified as female, 12 as male, and 1 as nonbinary). No statistically significant differences were observed among groups on believability of thoughts (F[2, 25] = .79, p = .47, ηp2 = .06), negativity of thoughts (F[2,25] = 1.49, p = .25, η 2 = .11), discomfort associated with thoughts (F[2, 25] = .48, p = .62, ηp2 = .04), and willingness (F[2, 25] = 3.00, p = .07, ηp2 = .19) to have negative self-referential thoughts. Moreover, substantial attrition of 72% was observed. Acceptability and usability of the chatbots employed are discussed as contributing toward the limited effectiveness of interventions and elevated attrition. Various recommendations are presented to support researchers and clinicians in developing engaging and effective chatbots.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 452-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Larsson ◽  
Nic Hooper ◽  
Lisa A. Osborne ◽  
Paul Bennett ◽  
Louise McHugh

2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terri L. Barrera ◽  
Derek D. Szafranski ◽  
Chelsea G. Ratcliff ◽  
Sarah L. Garnaat ◽  
Peter J. Norton

Background: One of the primary differences between Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) for anxiety is the approach to managing negative thoughts. CBT focuses on challenging the accuracy of dysfunctional thoughts through cognitive restructuring exercises, whereas ACT attempts to foster acceptance of such thoughts through cognitive defusion exercises. Previous research suggests that both techniques reduce the distress associated with negative thoughts, though questions remain regarding the benefit of these techniques above and beyond exposure to feared stimuli. Aims: In the present study, we conducted a brief experimental intervention to examine the utility of cognitive defusion + in-vivo exposure, cognitive restructuring + in-vivo exposure, and in-vivo exposure alone in reducing the impact of negative thoughts in patients with social anxiety disorder. Method: All participants completed a brief public speaking exposure and those in the cognitive conditions received training in the assigned cognitive technique. Participants returned a week later to complete a second exposure task and self-report measures. Results: All three conditions resulted in similar decreases in discomfort related to negative thoughts. ANOVA models failed to find an interaction between change in accuracy or importance and assignment to condition in predicting decreased distress of negative thoughts. Conclusions: These preliminary results suggest that changes in perceived importance and accuracy of negative thoughts may not be the mechanisms by which cognitive defusion and cognitive restructuring affect distress in the short-term.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Tafani ◽  
Lionel Souchet

This research uses the counter-attitudinal essay paradigm ( Janis & King, 1954 ) to test the effects of social actions on social representations. Thus, students wrote either a pro- or a counter-attitudinal essay on Higher Education. Three forms of counter-attitudinal essays were manipulated countering respectively a) students’ attitudes towards higher education; b) peripheral beliefs or c) central beliefs associated with this representation object. After writing the essay, students expressed their attitudes towards higher education and evaluated different beliefs associated with it. The structural status of these beliefs was also assessed by a “calling into question” test ( Flament, 1994a ). Results show that behavior challenging either an attitude or peripheral beliefs induces a rationalization process, giving rise to minor modifications of the representational field. These modifications are only on the social evaluative dimension of the social representation. On the other hand, when the behavior challenges central beliefs, the same rationalization process induces a cognitive restructuring of the representational field, i.e., a structural change in the representation. These results and their implications for the experimental study of representational dynamics are discussed with regard to the two-dimensional model of social representations ( Moliner, 1994 ) and rationalization theory ( Beauvois & Joule, 1996 ).


1988 ◽  
Vol 33 (9) ◽  
pp. 796-797
Author(s):  
Matthew Hugh Erdelyi

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