On the role of network externalities in strategic delegation contracts with an industry-wide union

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (21) ◽  
pp. 1621-1628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyang Hou ◽  
Shihuang Hong ◽  
Chunyu Zhao
Author(s):  
Akinori Tomohara

<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.6in 0pt 0.5in; tab-stops: .5in;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">While several surveys on technology diffusion have been undertaken, few attempts have been made to synthesize existing research to provide a framework for examining the role of governments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Is government intervention really required to remedy market failures caused by network externalities?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This paper covers recent developments in this area, focusing on works in stochastic evolutionary game theory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We relate the results of equilibrium selections to the role of governments. JEL classification: L1, L53 Keywords: Path Inefficiency; Market Failure; Network Externalities</span></span></p>


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