Strategic delegation and network externalities under export rivalry market

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kangsik Choi ◽  
Ki‐Dong Lee
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Strategic Delegation

On the role of network externalities in strategic delegation contracts with an industry-wide union

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (21) ◽  
pp. 1621-1628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyang Hou ◽  
Shihuang Hong ◽  
Chunyu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Strategic Delegation

A Note on Strategic Delegation and Network Externalities Under Export Rivalry Market

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kangsik Choi ◽  
Ki-Dong Lee
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Strategic Delegation

Trade Negotiations in the Presence of Network Externalities

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keiko Kubota
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Trade Negotiations

Firms’ Strategic Delegation With Heterogeneous Consumers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Pan ◽  
DongJoon Lee ◽  
Kangsik Choi
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Delegation ◽  
Heterogeneous Consumers

Screening with Network Externalities

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fanqi Shi ◽  
Yiqing Xing
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities

Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido S. Merzoni
Keyword(s):  
Trade Union ◽  
Strategic Delegation

Why Not Allow FASB and IASB Standards to Compete in the U.S.?

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald A. Dye ◽  
Shyam Sunder
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Standard Setting ◽  
Regulatory Competition ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
The Status ◽  
Informative Signals ◽  
The U.S

This paper discusses arguments for and against introducing competition into the accounting standard-setting process in the U.S. by allowing individual corporations to issue financial reports prepared in accordance with either FASB or IASB rules. The paper examines several arguments supporting the status quo, including (1) the FASB's experience and world leadership in making accounting rules; (2) the increased risk of a “race to the bottom” under regulatory competition; (3) the inability of most users of financial reports to understand the complex technical issues underlying accounting standards; (4) the possibility that IASB's standards will be diluted to gain international acceptance, allowing additional opportunities for earnings management; (5) the risks of the IASB being deadlocked or captured by interests hostile to business; (6) the costs of experimentation in standard setting; and (7) economies from network externalities. Arguments examined on the other side include how competition will (1) help meet the needs of globalized businesses; (2) increase the likelihood that the accounting standards will be efficient; (3) help protect standard setters from undue pressure from interest groups; (4) allow different standards to develop for different corporate clienteles; (5) allow corporations to send more informative signals by their choice of accounting standards; (6) protect corporations against capture of regulatory body by narrow interests; and (7) not affect network externalities at national or global scales.

Working Time under Alternative Pay Contracts in the Ride-Sharing Industry

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Filippo Belloc
Keyword(s):  
Network Effects ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Static Model ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Working Time ◽  
Intensive Margin ◽  
Hours Worked ◽  
Ride Sharing ◽  
Transportation Sector

AbstractWe study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay) and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards working time of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal working time vanishes. Our model helps identifying which is the pay scheme that best remunerates longer working times and offers insights to regulators seeking to improve the intensive margin of coverage by taxi services.

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