scholarly journals Which Product Will Survive To Be Standard?: Technology Adoption And The Role Of Governments

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Akinori Tomohara
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Technology Diffusion ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Recent Developments

<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.6in 0pt 0.5in; tab-stops: .5in;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">While several surveys on technology diffusion have been undertaken, few attempts have been made to synthesize existing research to provide a framework for examining the role of governments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Is government intervention really required to remedy market failures caused by network externalities?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This paper covers recent developments in this area, focusing on works in stochastic evolutionary game theory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We relate the results of equilibrium selections to the role of governments. JEL classification: L1, L53 Keywords: Path Inefficiency; Market Failure; Network Externalities</span></span></p>

scholarly journals Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory

PLoS ONE ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. e0140646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Di Stefano ◽  
Marialisa Scatà ◽  
Aurelio La Corte ◽  
Pietro Liò ◽  
Emanuele Catania ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game

The philosophical interpretation of language game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.

Designing Ecolabels In Order To Mitigate Market Failures

2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douadia Bougherara ◽  
Gilles Grolleau
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Cognitive Support

For the market for ecofriendly characteristics of agrofood products to function effectively, means of mitigating asymmetric information, informational overload and public goods properties are necessary. Ecolabel success requires a design and an implementation capable of mitigating simultaneously these three sources of market failures. Our contribution differs from many to date by (1) introducing and analyzing the informational overload as a source of market failure and (2) considering the ecolabel, not only as a tool to re-establish information symmetry between the producer and consumer but also as a way to overcome informational overload and public goods problems. We analyze how these sources of market failures may be mitigated by providing information perceived as trustworthy, tying credence and public attributes to verifiable and private attributes and designing the ecolabel as a cognitive support for consumers. We provide an exploratory qualitative study of several French ecolabels to stress how they more or less succeed in attenuating the identified sources of market failures. Several implications for policymakers and managers are stressed. We conclude by suggesting several issues requiring further investigations. JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D21, L15

scholarly journals Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy

1994 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J Liebowitz ◽  
Stephen E Margolis
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Network Externality ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Transition Problem

Economists have defined ‘network externality’ and have examined putative inframarginal market failures associated with it. This paper distinguishes between network effects and network externalities, where the latter are market failures. The authors argue that while network effects are important, network externalities are theoretically fragile and empirically undocumented. Some network externalities are merely pecuniary. Network ownership or transactions among network participants can internalize some network effects. The type of market failure that has been associated with these externalities is a transition problem that has little to do with externality.

scholarly journals Changing The Landscape Of The Retail Industry In The United States And Wal-Mart Phenomenon: A Brief Review

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Mirmirani
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Rapid Growth ◽  
The United States ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Retail Industry ◽  
Large Firms ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Recent Developments

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; mso-layout-grid-align: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This paper provides a quick review of the significant changes that have occurred in the retail industry in the United States. Of particular concern, are the more recent developments that occurred due to technological advances, i.e. E-commerce, and rapid growth in Wal-Mart&rsquo;s operations. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>It is noted that the industry has transitioned from a more competitive environment to an oligopolistic structure in which a few large firms dominate their respective market. The role of Wal-Mart is evaluated and its impact on the economy, in general, and in the retail industry, in particular, is elaborated upon.</span></span></p>

The Role of Government in a Liberal Market Economy

2018 ◽  
pp. 53-61
Author(s):  
Claude Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Failure Theory ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
The Government

This essay is a critical assessment of the market failure theory and public choice theory. While the market failure theory provides a justification for government intervention in the economy, the public choice theorists are very skeptical about the role of government as a corrector of market failures. Since government failures can be worse than market failures, the imperfections in the market process, they argue, do not necessarily call for government intervention. These two theoretical perspectives, notwithstanding their difference, do share something in common. Both assume that individuals are self-interested. This essay contends that a shift from rational self-interested behavior to bounded-rational behavior provides a less contested role for the government. With bounded-rational behavior, the state should no longer be viewed as a mere surrogate of the market, but as “a choice architect,” “an entrepreneur,” and “a manager of conflict.”

Corpus-Based Intention Recognition in Cooperation Dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Francisco C. Santos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Selection ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Window Of Opportunity ◽  
Intention Recognition ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
Cognitive Cost

Intention recognition is ubiquitous in most social interactions among humans and other primates. Despite this, the role of intention recognition in the emergence of cooperative actions remains elusive. Resorting to the tools of evolutionary game theory, herein we describe a computational model showing how intention recognition coevolves with cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. By equipping some individuals with the capacity of assessing the intentions of others in the course of a prototypical dilemma of cooperation—the repeated prisoner's dilemma—we show how intention recognition is favored by natural selection, opening a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive. We introduce a new strategy (IR) that is able to assign an intention to the actions of opponents, on the basis of an acquired corpus consisting of possible plans achieving that intention, as well as to then make decisions on the basis of such recognized intentions. The success of IR is grounded on the free exploitation of unconditional cooperators while remaining robust against unconditional defectors. In addition, we show how intention recognizers do indeed prevail against the best-known successful strategies of iterated dilemmas of cooperation, even in the presence of errors and reduction of fitness associated with a small cognitive cost for performing intention recognition.

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