Government intervention and executive compensation contracts of state-owned enterprises: empirical evidence from China

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 391-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ningyue Liu ◽  
Liming Wang ◽  
Min Zhang ◽  
Wen Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Compensation Contracts

Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation

2011 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 169-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phelim P. Boyle ◽  
Ranjini Jha ◽  
Shannon Kennedy ◽  
Weidong Tian
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Efficient Mechanism ◽  
Opposite Conclusion

There is controversy about the relative merits of stock and options in executive compensation. Some observers contend that stock is a more efficient mechanism, while others reach the opposite conclusion. We focus on the manager's risk-taking incentives and derive an optimal compensation contract by using the concept of a comparable benchmark and imposing a volatility constraint in a principal-agent framework. We demonstrate a joint role for both stock and options in the optimal contract. We show that firms with higher volatility should use more options in compensating their executives and provide empirical evidence supporting this testable implication.

The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1139-1163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takuya Iwasaki ◽  
Shota Otomasa ◽  
Atsushi Shiiba ◽  
Akinobu Shuto
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Compensation Contracts

CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts

2019 ◽  
pp. 105655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atif Ikram ◽  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li ◽  
Dylan Minor
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Compensation Contracts
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