Don’t Touch My Cheese: Short Selling Pressure, Executive Compensation Justification, and Real Activity Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (9) ◽  
pp. 1969-1990
Author(s):  
Fei Liu ◽  
Jianhua Du ◽  
Chao Bian
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Real Activity

Empirical research on the correlation between Real Earnings Management of state-owned enterprises and executive compensation — from the perspective of executive structural power

2019 ◽  
Vol 06 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Yu ◽  
Yuxuan Dai ◽  
Keguang Zheng ◽  
Yongjie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Real Activity ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This paper focuses on the impact of the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises and executive power on Real Activity Earnings Management (REM). Furthermore, this paper discusses the differences of impacts mentioned above between the central government holding enterprises and the local government holding enterprises, in order to test the impact of the government compensation regulation and the executive compensation of different types of enterprises on the enterprise accounting behavior. The empirical research shows that executive compensation can induce accountings to implement REM, which is more notable in local state-owned enterprises than in central enterprises.

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