scholarly journals Executive Compensation and Earnings Management under Moral Hazard

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Sun
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation

scholarly journals Executive Compensation and Earnings Management Under Moral Hazard

2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 (985) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Sun ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation

HUBUNGAN BOARD DAN KOMITE AUDIT TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fivi Anggraini
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

Earnings management is the moral hazard problem of manager that adses because of the conflict of interest between the manager as agent and the stakeholder and the owner as principal. The behavior of earnings management will immediately influence the reported earning. The aims of this research at examining the relationship of board and audit committe to earnings management. The samples of this research is all of companies member Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) in the years of 2003-2006 which were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The results of this study show that (1) the proportion of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (2) competence of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (3) the size of board had significant relationship to earning management, (4) the proportion of independent directors on the audit committe had not significant relationship to earning management, and (5) competence of members of the audit committe had significant relationship to earning management.

scholarly journals Executive Compensation, Earnings Management and Over Investment in Malaysia

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
ei yet Chu ◽  
Saw-Imm Song
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation

scholarly journals CSR-Contingent Executive Compensation Incentive and Earnings Management

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li ◽  
Caleb Thibodeau
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Corporate Social Performance ◽  
Social Performance ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Corporate Executives ◽  
Incentive Effects ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
Contingent Compensation ◽  
Corporate Social

This paper empirically studies the connection between earnings management and corporate social performance, conditional on the existence of CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts, an emerging practice to link executive compensation to corporate social performance. We find that executives are more likely to manipulate earnings to achieve their personal compensation goals when CSR rating is low, as well as their CSR-contingent compensation. Because of public pressure on their excessive total compensation, corporate executives see no need to manipulate earnings to increase compensation when their CSR-contingent compensation is already high. Our results suggest that earnings management and CSR-contingent compensation are substitute tools to serve the interests of executives, which is an agency problem that was never previously studied. Additionally, we explore how managerial characteristics affect earnings management, driven by the incentive effects of CSR-linked compensation.

Corporate Strategy, Executive Compensation Incentives and Earnings Management

Finance ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
瑞玥 张
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Corporate Strategy ◽  
Compensation Incentives
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