ABSTRACT
In the wake of September 11, 2001, Captains of the Port (COTPs) nationwide set into motion various security measures to protect potential targets (referred to as an “asset” throughout this paper) located in, on or near navigable waterways. However, the way in which these measures were carried out and the degree to which they were enforced were vastly different from port to port and raised much speculation in the U.S. maritime community over what the security landscape of the future would look like. Over one year later, maritime security practices remain a widely debated issue and one that will continue to challenge COTPs to answer the constantly looming questions of, “what is an adequate level of security for my port?,” “what level of security can I maintain at predefined Maritime Security (MARSEC) Conditions?” (USCG, 2002) and “how can I defend my assertions?” It is widely agreed in maritime security circles that concepts such as MARSEC Conditions and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) (USCG, 2002) are essential components of the port security posture of the 21st century, but most of this community will concede that they do not have a clear cut strategy on how to bridge the gap between transforming these lofty concepts into clearly defined, tactically sound and implementable security solutions. The purpose of this paper is to describe such a bridge, or a port security risk assessment methodology if you will, that is based on factual data that is verified by Coast Guard personnel and that synthesizes security concepts and Risk-Based Decision-Making (RBDM) methodologies (USCG, 2001) into systematic assessment phases that have been developed and tested by U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO) St. Louis, Missouri. Moreover, it describes how the analysis of the data gained from the assessment phases provided the COTP St. Louis with tangible and accurate data results that can now be used by Port Security Committees (PSCs) (USCG, 2002) as a foundation for tactical planning and the development of Port Security Plans (PSPs) (USCG, 2002). These PSPs meet the guidelines established in the U.S. Coast Guard's Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 9–02 entitled, “Guidelines for Port Security Committees, and Port Security Plans Required for U.S. Ports.” Once proven in broad applications, this tool can be consistently implemented by COTPs nationwide providing them with detailed port risk characterizations. Armed with this tactical analysis, COTPs can then accurately prioritize high-risk assets and maximize the use of PSC resources to stem potential terrorist threats or attacks.
A Novel Network Security Risk Assessment Approach by Combining Subjective and Objective Weights under Uncertainty
