The Neuroscience of Fair Play: Why We (Usually) Follow the Golden Rule. By Donald W. Pfaff; foreword by , Edward O. Wilson.  New York:  Dana Press. $20.95. xiii + 234 p.; ill.; index. 978‐1‐932594‐27‐0.  2007.

The editors of Moby-Dick as Doubloon sagely remark: ‘ Everything written about the book in 1851–1852, when reviews were affecting Melville's audiences and probably himself, is inherently more interesting than everything written in, say, 1951–1952 ’, This view is adequate reason for presenting the full text of over a dozen uncollected, unnoted reviews of Typee, Omoo, Mardi, Red-burn, White-Jacket, Moby-Dick, Pierre, and The Confidence Man, appearing in ten journals of the period: in Philadelphia, the Dollar Newspaper and The Spirit of the Times; in New York, Fisher's National Magazine and Hunt's Merchant's Magazine, Holden's Dollar Magazine, The Golden Rule, The Home Journal, and Peterson's Ladies' National Magazine; in Syracuse, the Literary Union; and in Boston, the Boston Weekly Museum. Five of these titles appear in books and articles devoted to other Melville reviews. The most interesting review is that in the Literary Union, which is unusually ingenious in its presentation of very perceptive comments. In view of the number and diverse nature of the reviews and notices, it seems preferable to group them by journal titles, with brief introductory comments for each, rather than by date or the titles of Melville's novels.

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Examining the Role of Trust and Informal Communication on Mutual Learning in Government

Organization & Environment ◽

10.1177/1086026616633254 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 30 (1) ◽

pp. 71-97 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Owen Temby ◽

Jean Sandall ◽

Ray Cooksey ◽

Gordon M. Hickey

Keyword(s):

Climate Change ◽

New York ◽

Two Dimensions ◽

Fair Play ◽

Informal Communication ◽

Informal Networks ◽

Mutual Learning ◽

Network Properties ◽

Interagency Relationships ◽

Formal Communication

Although public agencies must mutually coordinate climate policy and other complex environmental issues, the extent and relative importance of informal networks and different dimensions of trust to the process remains underresearched. Addressing this, we conducted surveys and interviews with civil servants from numerous agencies and three levels of government working on climate change–related policy in the state of New York. We examined the effect of two network properties on mutual learning on climate change–related issues: the extent to which interagency communication takes places through formal and informal channels, and the distribution of two dimensions of trust (“fair play” and “relational comfort”) across the network. Our analysis revealed that formal communication among staff at different agencies was utilized more often than informal and that interagency relationships were more characterized by a feeling of “fair play” than by “relational comfort,” yet informal communication and Relational Comfort were the most important in facilitating interagency collaboration.

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Enforcement

The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration ◽

10.1093/law/9780198796190.003.0007 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 185-215

Author(s):

Andrea K. Bjorklund

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

Due Process ◽

Fair Play ◽

International Arbitration ◽

Party Autonomy ◽

National Courts ◽

Recognition And Enforcement ◽

Procedural Safeguards ◽

New York Convention

This chapter addresses enforcement in international arbitration. The ready enforceability of arbitral awards is the single strongest component of the architecture that undergirds international arbitration. Two conventions are the primary mechanisms ensuring that enforceability: the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, colloquially known as the New York Convention; and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, colloquially referred to as the ICSID Convention or the Washington Convention. The regime for enforcement of arbitral awards is based on a structure that prioritizes enforcement so long as awards are rendered pursuant to certain largely procedural safeguards. This approach is an attempt to balance the principle of party autonomy with concern on the part of national courts that they not be co-opted into enforcing awards not consistent with at least rudimentary principles of fair play. Judgment debtors can thus resist enforcement should the arbitration have failed to comport with fundamental notions of due process. In the case of the New York Convention, two other grounds for resisting enforcement have to do with policy considerations in the enforcing state.

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