Agenda Control

The 1991–2015 period saw both the diminished importance of the traditional anti-system parties of the left (due to the end of Communist rule in Europe) as well as the rise of new populist radical right-wing parties. As a response to the sharp rise of tactical obstruction by loyal opposition parties, the French National Assembly became a hybrid legislature when committees were empowered under centralized agenda control in 2008. With no similar increase of obstruction in the British House of Commons, no substantial procedural reform occurred. In the two working legislatures (the Riksdag and the Bundestag), legislators maintained their preference for work. This explains the procedural path dependence in both legislatures despite the appearance of a potential anti-system party (the Sweden Democrats) in the Riksdag. Given the absence of sustained obstruction by the Sweden Democrats, followers successfully reversed an attempt to informally centralize agenda control in the Riksdag.

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Rules to Live By: Agenda Control and the Partisan Use of Special Rules in the House

Congress & the Presidency ◽

10.1080/07343469.2011.640382 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 39 (1) ◽

pp. 28-50 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Jeremy F. Duff ◽

David W. Rohde

Keyword(s):

Agenda Control ◽

Special Rules

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Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress

American Politics Research ◽

10.1177/1532673x13511109 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 42 (4) ◽

pp. 600-627 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Keith L. Dougherty ◽

Michael S. Lynch ◽

Anthony J. Madonna

Keyword(s):

Agenda Control

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Unity in Diversity? The Development of Political Parties in the Parliament of Canada, 1867–2011

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123415000368 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 47 (3) ◽

pp. 545-569 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Jean-François Godbout ◽

Bjørn Høyland

Keyword(s):

Party System ◽

The United States ◽

House Of Commons ◽

Agenda Control ◽

Party Discipline ◽

Electoral Incentives ◽

Unity In Diversity ◽

Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries ◽

Party Cohesion ◽

Party Voting

What explains the development of legislative party voting unity? Evidence from the United States and Britain indicate that partisan sorting, cohort replacement effects, electoral incentives, and agenda control contributed to enhancing party cohesion during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here, these mechanisms are evaluated by analysing a dataset containing all the recorded votes from the Canadian House of Commons, 1867–2011. Overall, we find that partisan sorting and the government’s ability to control the agenda are central to the consolidation of parties over time. Our results underscore the need to integrate institutional rules and legislative agendas into models of parliamentary voting behaviour and suggest that strict party discipline can lead to the development of a multi-party system in the legislative arena.

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