Defended or defunded? Local and state policy outcomes of the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests

This article provides novel evidence on the local policy outcomes of the largest protest movement in U.S. history: the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests. Building on a hand-compiled dataset containing information on the 300 largest cities in the United States, data on state legislation, and comprehensive protest data, we assess whether two core political demands of the movement were realized. We find that protest did not affect city police budgets but did lead to the adoptions of state police reform. We do not find compelling evidence that protest affected agenda setting at the state-level. Although inconsequential in local politics overall, protest proved counterproductive in cities with large white population shares and large Republican population shares. We argue that local and state politics offer different political opportunities for protests to succeed. In state politics, protest creates electoral incentives to make political concessions. In local politics, a lack of political threat and the perception of protest as inconvenient create political incentives to resist policy change.

Germany

This chapter analyzes the institutional foundation of parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag. Based on 89,920 speeches given between 1990 and 2017, we explore factors influencing debate participation. Some systematic patterns of debate participation emerge: We show that policy expertise is a strong predictor of debate participation as many debates are dominated by the members of the respective working groups of the parliamentary party groups. Moreover, we show that government members and party leaders give more speeches than backbenchers. We find no significant differences between MPs from single-member districts and party lists, which is hardly surprising, given the complex contamination of electoral incentives between the two types of MPs. Personal characteristics of MPs also matter as MP’s gender influences the participation in debates.

Austria

In the Austrian parliament a strict time regime keeps the length of debates at bay. While the government sets most of the agenda, opposition parties can get some proposals debated, and new instruments provide room for debate of topics independent of government legislation and reports. Debates are under tight party control with regard to the speakers’ nomination and the speakers sticking to the party line. Individual MPs do have electoral incentives to seek speaking assignments, but for most this results in low-level satisficing rather than maximizing speaking assignments. Party-size is a crucial factor determining the floor presence: MPs belonging to a small party have better chances to speak. Within parties, individual talent of MPs as speakers and their occupation of key party functions such as parliamentary party leader, or party spokesperson in a specific policy area are crucial for nominations.

Poland

This chapter provides an overview of parliamentary speechmaking in the lower house of the Polish parliament, the Sejm, between 1991 and 2015. Members of the Sejm are elected under an open-list PR system, which creates incentives for legislators to use parliamentary speeches to cultivate personal vote. By analyzing all speeches held in seven terms, we find some evidence that electoral incentives impact parliamentary speechmaking. However, we observe no differences between female and male legislators. Furthermore, we conduct an analysis of speechmaking in two specific types of debates. We explain what groups of legislators participate in them and offer an interpretation of the observed effects.

Italy

This essay examines speechmaking activity in the Italian Chamber of Deputies from 1996 to 2018. Such a period covers almost entirely the phase called the “Second Republic” following a radical change in the electoral rules and the party system that Italy experienced in the early 1990s. Our analysis of the determinants of speechmaking activity shows that the small percentage of MPs holding leading positions within and for their party in the legislative and executive arena (e.g., committee chairs, parliamentary party groups’ leaders, ministers) do speak more in parliament. Our results largely confirm the hypothesis that, in systems where party government is predominant, floor access is strictly controlled by political parties. This hypothesis receives further support from the analysis carried out in the section of this chapter examining the impact of different electoral incentives on speechmaking activity.

Israel

This chapter investigates the factors affecting floor access in the Israeli national parliament—the Knesset. Although Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional, closed-list electoral system, the Knesset’s rules of procedure give little control to parties over floor access. Analyzing over 46,000 speeches over three terms between 2009 and 2019, even in debates where party leadership does have control over who takes the floor, we find no strong evidence that such control is used to give more speech time to highly ranked representatives. This is at odds with predictions made by others in two ways: First, in that the parliamentary rules do not reflect the electoral incentives of party leadership; Second, in that parties do not appear to utilize whatever ability they possess to control their representatives’ speechmaking.

Chile

This chapter examines speech participation in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. It discusses the rules structuring speech participation, the impact of electoral incentives, and the country’s party system. The empirical analysis examines all speeches delivered on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies between 2006 and 2018. We find that being in the opposition increases the likelihood of delivering a speech and that legislators from more remote districts deliver more speeches than members whose districts are closer to the main metropolitan area of the country. Relevant differences between those on the right and those on the left are also present. There is no evidence—when looking at all speeches delivered without distinguishing between the type of speech or stage of the chamber’s session—that party leaders or committee chairs speak more often than other legislators or that men speak more often than women.

How Do Electoral Incentives Affect Legislator Behavior? Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures

A classic question about democratic elections is how much they are able to influence politician behavior by forcing them to anticipate future reelection attempts, especially in contexts where voters are not paying close attention and are not well informed. We compile a new dataset containing roughly 780,000 bills, combined with more than 16 million roll-call voting records for roughly 6,000 legislators serving in U.S. state legislatures with term limits. Using an individual-level difference-in-differences design, we find that legislators who can no longer seek reelection sponsor fewer bills, are less productive on committees, and are absent for more floor votes, on average. Building a new dataset of roll-call votes and interest-group ratings, we find little evidence that legislators who cannot run for reelection systematically shift their ideological platforms. In sum, elections appear to influence how legislators allocate their effort in important ways even in low-salience environments but may have less influence on ideological positioning.

Electoral Systems And The Autocrat's Trade-Off: Evidence From The Russian Duma

Legislative elections sustain authoritarian regimes. However, properties of any electoral system may simultaneously benefit and hurt regimes’ political prospects. We propose a trade-off between electoral systems facilitating parliamentary bargaining and electoral systems maintaining legislative control. While an electoral system can achieve either, it cannot solve both. We investigate this theory by studying Russian federal deputies, half of which are elected in a first-past-the-post single-member district, the other half on a nationwide closed-party list. Candidates can register on both lists, and district results determine final list affiliation. We exploit that electoral incentives change abruptly for deputies barely winning/losing the district, to identify effects of list affiliation on pro and anti-regime parliamentary behavior. Results support a trade-off: while district deputies bargain more for local amendments in parliamentary speeches, they also more often seek to obstruct legislation. How autocrats weigh this trade-off determines the electoral system, and illuminates electoral system reform in autocracies.