This chapter examines the key figures in American and British conservative liberalism; the context in which they thought and wrote; how their thinking evolved; the reception of Ordo-liberalism; and the significance of conservative liberalism in their wider political economies. It shows why conservative liberalism did not flourish in a consistent manner, even with British Conservatives and American Republicans in power. Its significance was conditioned by cultural, historical, and institutional legacies, notably contending national unifying myths; by ideological competition from parties that gave primacy to reducing inequality of wealth and income and to economic security; by the structures of political incentives; and by crises and accidents. In the United States, the obstacles included opposition from the interventionism of the New Deal and the national security state, from the libertarianism of the frontier spirit, and from the idea of a Christian America, along with the structures of divided government. In Britain, they were linked to the post-war role of the welfare state and the global player in national unifying myth and the long shadow of Keynes. The chapter examines in detail the contributions of James Buchanan, Frank Knight, Walter Lippmann, and Henry Simons to US economic and political thought. In the case of Britain, the chapter focuses on Edwin Cannan, Ralph Hawtrey, William Hutt, Lionel Robbins, and Alan Peacock. The chapter concludes with reflections on the prospects of conservative liberalism, including on the contributions of John Rawls and Amartya Sen.