Final reflections

Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘Final reflections’ explains that as the understanding of markets and economic theory evolves, so does the application of competition law. With changing market and socio-political realities, these challenges become apparent. We need to consider the rise of digital markets and the threat of climate change, and assess the effect they have on the enforcement of competition and antitrust laws. What is the right formulation of competition policy? The key to effective competition law enforcement lies not in the pretence of purity or certainty, but in an open and informed debate on the law and economics, and the society to which we aspire.

2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1289-1291

Pierre Y. Cremieux of Analysis Group Inc. reviews “Monopsony in Law and Economics” by Roger D. Blair and Jeffrey L. Harrison. The EconLit abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Expanded second edition explores the law and economics of monopsony. Discusses the antitrust laws and monopsonistic forms of conduct; the economic theory of monopsony; the antitrust response to monopsony and collusive monopsony; cooperative buying efforts; bilateral monopoly; monopsony and antitrust enforcement; monopsony in action--agricultural markets; monopsony in action--the NCAA; and monopsony in action--Physician Collective. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. Harrison is Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law at the University of Florida College of Law. Bibliography; index.”


Author(s):  
Anton Morozov ◽  
Andrey Shastitko

In many cases of competition law enforcement counterfeit goods are not included within the product-market boundaries on an equal basis with the original product. However, existing literature highlights that illegal copies should be included in market boundaries, since from the consumer's viewpoint counterfeit is a substitute of an original good. In this article, we determine the conditions under which counterfeit products should be included either in market shares of original producers or when counterfeit manufacturers should be recognized as right holder competitors. We conclude that in case of strong network effects counterfeit product should be included in the market share of the right holder. On the contrary, when network effects are weak, pirates or counterfeit manufacturers should be considered as competitors of original product producers.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Murgatroyd ◽  
Simon Baker

Although provisions prohibiting abuses of dominance through the setting of excessive prices have long been present under many competition jurisdictions, prohibitions have been seldom applied in practice. This is most likely due to the profound conceptual and practical difficulties in differentiating between pricing conduct that is neutral from a competition law perspective and conduct that genuinely constitutes excessive pricing, and then further problems in remedying genuine abuses. However, recent developments in South African competition policy have focussed on use of import parity pricing as a possible indicator of excessive pricing, although in our view the mere existence of import parity pricing is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of such conduct. This paper draws upon economic theory and relevant jurisprudence to provide clarity as to the circumstances under which import parity pricing might reflect excessive pricing. It then considers the prospects for effective remedies if an abuse is identified.


Author(s):  
Argenton Cédric ◽  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Stephan Andreas

This concluding chapter draws together major insights from the previous chapters and considers their broader implications in economics. It argues that economics can and should contribute to informing the design of many aspects of cartel law, since the decision to participate in a cartel is essentially an economic one. Competition lawyers should therefore be prepared to take the time to follow and understand the arguments that economic theory or evidence bring to the table. Equally, competition economists' work needs take account of the practical and administrative realities of running an enforcement regime. Economics also has an important role to play in evaluating the value and effectiveness of competition law more generally. The chapter concludes by calling for the continued multi-disciplinary research of cartels and other questions of competition policy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Kadar

AbstractWhat is the role of European competition policy in the digital economy? Even if it cannot deal with all perceived issues in digital markets, competition law enforcement is the appropriate tool to remedy distortions to competition caused by market power, without the introduction of pervasive ex-ante sector-specific regulation being required. Whilst some of the proposals for reform of the European competition law legal framework recently brought may have some merit in principle, the current regime appears to be suitable and sufficiently flexible to allow the Commission to intervene effectively and remedy competitive distortions in digital markets.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anaheed Al-Hardan

The 1948 Nakba has, in light of the 1993 Oslo Accords and Palestinian refugee activists' mobilisation around the right of return, taken on a new-found centrality and importance in Palestinian refugee communities. Closely-related to this, members of the ‘Generation of Palestine’, the only individuals who can recollect Nakba memories, have come to be seen as the guardians of memories that are eventually to reclaim the homeland. These historical, social and political realities are deeply rooted in the ways in which the few remaining members of the generation of Palestine recollect 1948. Moreover, as members of communities that were destroyed in Palestine, and whose common and temporal and spatial frameworks were non-linearly constituted anew in Syria, one of the multiples meanings of the Nakba today can be found in the way the refugee communities perceive and define this generation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.


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