The moral supervenience thesis is not a conceptual truth

Analysis ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Truth ◽  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
Moral Supervenience

Reply to Almeida

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK C. MURPHY
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Property A ◽  
Property B ◽  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
Moral Supervenience

Michael J. Almeida offers two criticisms of the argument of my ‘A trilemma for divine command theory’. The first criticism is that I mistakenly assume the validity of the following inference pattern: property A is identical to property B; property B supervenes on property C; therefore, property A supervenes on property C. The second criticism is that I have misinterpreted the moral-supervenience thesis upon which I rely in making this argument. The first of Almeida's criticisms is completely untenable. The second of his criticisms casts doubt on my argument, a doubt that I can mitigate but not entirely dispel.

scholarly journals Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debbie Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Truth ◽  
Base Property ◽  
Normative Discourse ◽  
Moral Supervenience ◽  
Conceptual Necessity ◽  
Base Properties

According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold (NS*): As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. The main aim in this chapter is to show that none of the available arguments establish (NS*), or indeed the relevant epistemic, aesthetic, and moral supervenience theses. (NS*) is not a conceptual truth. This has considerable dialectical importance. One interesting upshot is that it affords non-reductivists and non-naturalists a novel way of resisting certain prominent supervenience-based objections to their views, including objections that formulate supervenience as a purely metaphysical thesis.

Physicalism UnBlocked

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (7) ◽  
pp. 890-904
Author(s):  
D. Gene Witmer
Keyword(s):  
Independent Interest ◽  
Supervenience Thesis

AbstractWhat has become known as the blockers problem is an alleged difficulty facing attempts to formulate physicalism as a supervenience thesis. A blocker is an entity, itself contrary to physicalism, with the power to disrupt an otherwise necessary connection between physical and nonphysical conditions. I argue that there is no distinct blockers problem. Insofar as a problem can be identified, it turns out to be just a rather baroque version of a distinct and familiar objection to supervenience formulations and to be of no independent interest. Work on the formulation of physicalism can thus proceed without worrying about blockers.

Relationships Between Law and Morality

2019 ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Kenneth Einar Himma
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Conceptual Truth ◽  
Legal Validity ◽  
Law And Morality

This chapter distinguishes three types of inquiry about law. It articulates the two conceptual views about morality and the nature of law that comprise the focus of this volume. First, the chapter explains positivist and anti-positivist views with respect to whether it is a conceptual truth that the criteria of legal validity include moral constraints on the content of law. It then turns to the dispute between inclusive and exclusive positivists with respect to whether it is conceptually possible for a legal system to have content-based moral criteria of validity. Finally, this chapter argues that the claim that conceptual jurisprudence should not be done is either unclear or false.

scholarly journals Debunking, supervenience, and Hume’s Principle

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (8) ◽  
pp. 1083-1103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Leng
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Realism ◽  
Mathematical Beliefs ◽  
Conceptual Truth ◽  
Hume’S Principle ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Facts

AbstractDebunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.

Conceptual Truth, Necessity, and Negation

The Monist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 468-480
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Narboux
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Conceptual Scheme ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Conceptual Truth ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
Historical Phenomenon

Abstract Throughout his philosophical career, Hilary Putnam was preoccupied with the question of what survives of the traditional notion of a priori truth in light of the recurring historical phenomenon, made prominent by the scientific revolutions of the early decades of the twentieth century, through which “something that was literally inconceivable has turned out to be true” (1962b). Impugning the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, Putnam’s redefinition of “conceptual truth” in terms of “quasi-necessity relative to a conceptual scheme” is meant to accommodate the possibility of transitions of just this sort. In this essay, I trace the origins and development of Putnam’s account of “quasi-necessity.” I try to defend it against some objections naturally arising in connection with the interplay of modality and negation. My main contention is that the main tenets of Putnam’s semantic externalism inform his reconception of conceptual truth, and that they must be recognized to hold of such basic logical notions as those of judgment and negation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document