The Dubious Moral Supervenience Thesis

2017 ◽  
pp. 89-104
Author(s):  
Gerald K. Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
Moral Supervenience

Reply to Almeida

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK C. MURPHY
Keyword(s):  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Property A ◽  
Property B ◽  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
Moral Supervenience

Michael J. Almeida offers two criticisms of the argument of my ‘A trilemma for divine command theory’. The first criticism is that I mistakenly assume the validity of the following inference pattern: property A is identical to property B; property B supervenes on property C; therefore, property A supervenes on property C. The second criticism is that I have misinterpreted the moral-supervenience thesis upon which I rely in making this argument. The first of Almeida's criticisms is completely untenable. The second of his criticisms casts doubt on my argument, a doubt that I can mitigate but not entirely dispel.

Physicalism UnBlocked

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (7) ◽  
pp. 890-904
Author(s):  
D. Gene Witmer
Keyword(s):  
Independent Interest ◽  
Supervenience Thesis

AbstractWhat has become known as the blockers problem is an alleged difficulty facing attempts to formulate physicalism as a supervenience thesis. A blocker is an entity, itself contrary to physicalism, with the power to disrupt an otherwise necessary connection between physical and nonphysical conditions. I argue that there is no distinct blockers problem. Insofar as a problem can be identified, it turns out to be just a rather baroque version of a distinct and familiar objection to supervenience formulations and to be of no independent interest. Work on the formulation of physicalism can thus proceed without worrying about blockers.

scholarly journals NESATYS KAIP REDUKTYVISTINĖS PRIEŽASTINGUMO ANALIZĖS ARGUMENTAS

Problemos ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 104-114
Author(s):  
Vytautas Grenda
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
The World ◽  
Supervenience Thesis

Straipsnis supažindina su argumentu už reduktyvistinę, hiumišką priežastingumo sampratą. Remiamasi Davido Lewiso ir Hugh’o Melloro įžvalga, kad negali egzistuoti priežastis ir jų padarinius siejantis santykis, nes priežastimis ar padariniais gali būti vadinami ne tik pozityvūs, bet ir negatyvūs faktai ar įvykiai (nesatys). Jeigu toks santykis neegzistuoja, tai prieš vadinamąją „hiumiškojo supervenavimo“ tezę nukreipti mintiniai eksperimentai negali įrodyti, jog priežastingumas yra neredukuojama pasaulio ypatybė. Daugiausia, ką jie gali įrodyti, – tai įprastinės priežastingumo sampratos prieštaringumą. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: priežastingumas, hiumizmas, nesatys.Absences as an Argument for Reductionist Analysis of CausationVytautas Grenda SummaryThe article advances an argument in favour of the reductionist, Humean conception of causation. The author draws upon an insight of David Lewis and Hugh Mellor: there can be no irreducible relation between causes and their effects, because not only the case that something exists, but also the case that something does not exist (i. e. absence) can be called a cause or an effect. If there’s no such a relation, then the thought experiments that are directed against the so-called “Humean supervenience” thesis cannot prove that causation is an irreducible feature of the world. The utmost such experiments can prove is that the ordinary conception of causation is inconsistent. Keywords: causation, humeanism, absences.ht: 115%; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"> 

Explaining why this body gives rise to me qua subject instead of someone else: an argument for classical substance dualism

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH EINAR HIMMA
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Substance Dualism ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
The Mind

AbstractSince something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on the mind–body supervenience thesis, which would include William Hasker's emergent dualism. Since the particular thought-experiment does not pose any problems for classical substance dualism (CSD) and since the problem, as I call it, of explaining subjectivity is the central problem of mind, I conclude that CSD is better supported than any form of non-reductive physicalism.

scholarly journals Moral supervenience

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 592-615 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anandi Hattiangadi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Conceivability Argument ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Moral Supervenience ◽  
The One ◽  
Special Case

AbstractIt is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.

Moral Supervenience

1995 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 240-262
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Supervenience

Begging the question of causation in a critique of the neuron doctrine

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 846-846
Author(s):  
J. Tim O'Meara
Keyword(s):  
Physical Theory ◽  
Regularity Theory ◽  
Begging The Question ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Supervenience Thesis ◽  
Physical Causation

Gold & Stoljar's argument rejecting the “explanatory sufficiency” of the radical neuron doctrine depends on distinguishing it from the trivial neuron doctrine. This distinction depends on the thesis of “supervenience,” which depends on Hume's regularity theory of causation. In contrast, the radical neuron doctrine depends on a physical theory of causation, which denies the supervenience thesis. Insofar as the target article argues by drawing implications from the premise of Humean causation, whereas the radical doctrine depends on the competing premise of physical causation, the resulting critique of the neuron doctrine amounts largely to begging the question of causation.

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