Self-Defence and a Phronetic Use of Violence: A Christian Response to Muslim-mob Attacks in Northern Nigeria

The sermon on the mount has often been used to support a nonviolent response to any form of injustice and violent attacks against Christians. This article argues that the sermon, understood in its original Old and New Testament contexts, does not necessarily support a wholesale prohibition of the use of violence. It also argues that the implicit ethical theory of the sermon – and the New Testament in general – is a combination of a virtue ethics and a divine command theory. On this premise, one is able to show that a measured use of violence for self-defence is a theologically tenable Christian response to unauthorized attacks. This measured use of violence for self-defence is qualified by a Christian phronesis or practical wisdom, which takes into full account both the teaching of Jesus on love of the enemy and the contextual or existential realities of Christians facing violent attacks in northern Nigeria.

The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory

Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). The objection that DCM "has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible". This article criticizes Wielenberg's argument. Section 1 will expound Wielenberg's new "psychopath" argument in the context of the recent debate over the Promulgation Objection. Section 2 will discuss two ambiguities in the argument; in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous between whether Wielenberg uses the word "obligation" in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 will argue that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that that psychopaths "have no moral obligations". By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that Divine command theorists are committed to denying psychopaths have obligations.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 9

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy annually collects the best current work in the field of medieval philosophy. The various volumes print original essays, reviews, critical discussions, and editions of texts. The aim is to contribute to an understanding of the full range of themes and problems in all aspects of the field, from late antiquity into the Renaissance, and extending over the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian traditions. Volume 9 ranges widely over this terrain, including Mark Kalderon on Augustine’s theory of perception, Alexander Lamprakis on belief in miracles among Baghdad Christian philosophers, Andreas Lammer on Avicenna on time, Ana María Mora-Márquez on logical methodology, Franziska van Buren on Bonaventure’s theory of universals, Eric Hagedorn on Ockham’s divine-command theory, and Dominik Perler on exemplar causes in Suárez.

The muʿtazila's arguments against divine command theory

The Muʿtazilī theologians, particularly the later Imāmī ones, developed numerous interesting arguments against divine command theory. The arguments, however, have not received the attention they deserve. Some of the arguments have been discussed in passing, and some have not been discussed at all. In this article, I aim to present and analyse the arguments. To that end, I first distinguish between different semantic, ontological, epistemological, and theological theses that were often conflated in the debate, and examine the logical relation among them. Then I go over the Muʿtazila's arguments determining, among other things, which of the theses was targeted by each argument. In presenting the arguments, I focus mainly on the late kalām period, the period falling roughly between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries of the common era, as the arguments were at their most sophisticated level by this time.