Allee effects drive the coevolution of cooperation and group size in high reproductive skew groups

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-671
Author(s):  
Brian A Lerch ◽  
Karen C Abbott

Abstract The evolution of cooperation between conspecifics is a fundamental evolutionary puzzle, with much work focusing on the evolution of cooperative breeding. Surprisingly, although we expect cooperation to affect the population structures in which individuals interact, most studies fail to allow cooperation and population structure to coevolve. Here, we build two models containing group-level Allee effects (positive density dependence at low group sizes) to study the coevolution of cooperation and group size. Group-level Allee effects, although common in cooperatively breeding species, remain understudied for their evolutionary implications. We find that a trait that affects group size can cause increased cooperation to be favored evolutionarily even in a group with complete reproductive skew. In particular, we find a single evolutionarily stable attractor in our model corresponding to moderate helpfulness and group size. In general, our results demonstrate that, even in groups with complete reproductive skew, Allee effects can be important for the evolution of cooperation and that the evolution of cooperation may be closely linked to the evolution of group size. Further, our model matches empirical data in African wild dogs (Lycaon pictus), suggesting that it may have an application in understanding social evolution in this endangered species.

2020 ◽  
Vol 287 (1936) ◽  
pp. 20202025
Author(s):  
Cody T. Ross ◽  
Adrian V. Jaeggi ◽  
Monique Borgerhoff Mulder ◽  
Jennifer E. Smith ◽  
Eric Alden Smith ◽  
...  

Inequality or skew in reproductive success (RS) is common across many animal species and is of long-standing interest to the study of social evolution. However, the measurement of inequality in RS in natural populations has been challenging because existing quantitative measures are highly sensitive to variation in group/sample size, mean RS, and age-structure. This makes comparisons across multiple groups and/or species vulnerable to statistical artefacts and hinders empirical and theoretical progress. Here, we present a new measure of reproductive skew, the multinomial index, M , that is unaffected by many of the structural biases affecting existing indices. M is analytically related to Nonacs’ binomial index, B , and comparably accounts for heterogeneity in age across individuals; in addition, M allows for the possibility of diminishing or even highly nonlinear RS returns to age. Unlike B , however, M is not biased by differences in sample/group size. To demonstrate the value of our index for cross-population comparisons, we conduct a reanalysis of male reproductive skew in 31 primate species. We show that a previously reported negative effect of group size on mating skew was an artefact of structural biases in existing skew measures, which inevitably decline with group size; this bias disappears when using M . Applying phylogenetically controlled, mixed-effects models to the same dataset, we identify key similarities and differences in the inferred within- and between-species predictors of reproductive skew across metrics. Finally, we provide an R package, SkewCalc , to estimate M from empirical data.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Georg Nöldeke

AbstractHow the size of social groups affects the evolution of cooperative behaviors is a classic question in evolutionary biology. Here we investigate group size effects in the evolutionary dynamics of games in which individuals choose whether to cooperate or defect and payoffs do not depend directly on the size of the group. We find that increasing the group size decreases the proportion of cooperators at both stable and unstable rest points of the replicator dynamics. This implies that larger group sizes can have negative effects (by reducing the amount of cooperation at stable polymorphisms) and positive effects (by enlarging the basin of attraction of more cooperative outcomes) on the evolution of cooperation. These two effects can be simultaneously present in games whose evolutionary dynamics feature both stable and unstable rest points, such as public goods games with participation thresholds. Our theory recovers and generalizes previous results and is applicable to a broad variety of social interactions that have been studied in the literature.


2005 ◽  
Vol 266 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Carbone ◽  
L. Frame ◽  
G. Frame ◽  
J. Malcolm ◽  
J. Fanshawe ◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Gusset ◽  
David W. Macdonald

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 1414-1422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Creel ◽  
Nancy Marusha Creel

PLoS ONE ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. e99686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig R. Jackson ◽  
R. John Power ◽  
Rosemary J. Groom ◽  
Emmanuel H. Masenga ◽  
Ernest E. Mjingo ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document