A Graphical Exposition of the Economic Theory of Regulation

2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 592-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Randolph Beard ◽  
David L. Kaserman ◽  
John W. Mayo
Public Choice ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 79 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 247-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Teske ◽  
Samuel Best ◽  
Michael Mintrom

1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Luc Migué

1999 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-136
Author(s):  
Daniel Sutter

Abstract This article considers the regulation of externalities within the interest group model of politics. A group concerned about correcting an externality generates zero marginal support at the efficient level of regulation. Politicians respond to interests directly affected by policy and thus inefficiently correct externalities.


1989 ◽  
Vol 1989 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Peltzman ◽  
Michael E. Levine ◽  
Roger G. Noll

1978 ◽  
Vol 86 (2, Part 1) ◽  
pp. 245-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burton A. Abrams ◽  
Russell F. Settle

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