Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation

Author(s):  
Fred S. McChesney
1999 ◽  
Vol 97 (6) ◽  
pp. 1771
Author(s):  
Douglas Ginsburg ◽  
Fred S. McChesney

Public Choice ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 79 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 247-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Teske ◽  
Samuel Best ◽  
Michael Mintrom

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sascha Muennich

This article shows how research on the social structure of markets may contribute to the analysis the growing income inequality in contemporary capitalist economies. The author proposes a theoretical link between embeddedness and social stratification by discussing the role of institutions and networks in markets for the distribution of economic profits between firms. The author claims that we must understand profit and free competition as opposites, as economic theory does. In the main part of the article the author illustrates six typical mechanisms of rent extraction from networks or formal and symbolic rules that embed markets. They emerge from material as well as symbolical access to and influence on the orientation of other market actors. Social structures in markets lead to unequal chances for rent extraction, even if actors produce them for coordination rather than for accumulation purposes. This is how market sociology and theory of capitalism can be linked more closely.


1999 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-136
Author(s):  
Daniel Sutter

Abstract This article considers the regulation of externalities within the interest group model of politics. A group concerned about correcting an externality generates zero marginal support at the efficient level of regulation. Politicians respond to interests directly affected by policy and thus inefficiently correct externalities.


1989 ◽  
Vol 1989 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Peltzman ◽  
Michael E. Levine ◽  
Roger G. Noll

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