When do political parties listen to interest groups?

This paper examines when parties listen to interest groups and adopt their input. Interest group information can help parties bolster their positions, and by taking their input into account, parties show that they are responsive to the groups’ interests which can increase their appeal to their constituents. Listening to interest groups can, however, also repel voters who disagree with the groups’ positions. This paper argues that party and issue-level characteristics affect whether the benefits of listening to interest groups exceed the costs. Examining more than 25,000 party-interest group observations on 88 Norwegian policy proposals and using a text reuse approach to measure interest group influence, the findings indicate that public salience, party issue emphasis, interest group coalitions, and government status affect parties’ propensity to listen. This implies that interest groups can be a pertinent source of information for parties under certain circumstances which affects the link between voters and parties.

The Varying Mechanisms of Media Access: Explaining Interest Groups’ Media Visibility across Political Systems

A growing body of studies analyzes interest groups’ media visibility. Yet little is known about how the drivers of media access may vary across different interest group systems. This article focuses on two major mechanisms through which organizations can gain media visibility: media management efforts and the newsworthiness of elite actors. We hypothesize that media effort explains interest groups’ media access more strongly in competitive, pluralist interest group systems and that insider (i.e. “elite”) status does so more strongly in hierarchical, corporatist systems. We analyze surveys and media data on interest groups in the pluralist United Kingdom, the moderately corporatist Denmark, and the more strongly corporatist Finland. As hypothesized, media effort is most effective in the UK and weakest in Finland. However, we find only weak support for the insider status hypothesis: there is some evidence of the expected cross-country differences, but the effects are small and unrobust.

9. European Union agencies:

The institutional development of EU agencies is striking. Over the past decades, forty-six EU agencies have been established to support the European Commission and member states in their regulatory and executive tasks. Today, EU agencies are a vital part of the EU’s administrative capacity. EU agencies have received considerable scholarly attention that used a myriad of theoretical approaches—ranging from institutional, organizational, and bureaucratic reputation to interest-group theories—to explain why EU agencies have been created; how they develop over time; whether they are wielders of supranational or intergovernmental power; how they legitimize themselves and cultivate a positive bureaucratic reputation; and how they form alliances or insulate themselves from specific stakeholders. This chapter reviews the rise of EU agencies and introduces a selection of theoretical perspectives that have been used by EU agency scholars to study EU-level agencification and EU agency behaviour, regulatory processes, and outputs.

“Europeanization” of Think Tanks in the EU Interest Group Politics

The article reveals the characteristics of think tanks as actors of the interest group politics in the European Union (EU). In this policy, they inspire public debate, conduct research, encourage new legislation and more effective public administration. A large number of European think tanks is engaged in interest group politics both at the national and supranational level of the EU governance, encouraging integration processes among the EU countries and Europeanization, which is the subject of analysis of this study. The strengthening of the role and importance of interest groups in EU policy is largely due to the increased power of the Unions institutions, since the introduction of new legislation and regulation common to all EU countries leads to the feedback from various groups that represent both public and private interests. Obviously, these groups, when interacting with the power institutions of the EU, strive for the most effective protection of their interests. For this purpose their representatives hold meetings with officials of the European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as other structures of the Union. This interaction, aiming at promoting their interests by means of lobbying and advocacy, has been regulated since 2011 by the Transparency Register, jointly created by the European Commission and the European Parliament. The purpose of this study is to analyze the quantitative performance of think tanks in the EU and to develop on its basis the Ranking of EU countries, according to the level of Europeanization of the think tanks representing them. From the research methods perspective, the study is based on the matching of statistical data from the Transparency Register and the Global Go To Think Tank Index, which serves the basis for this Ranking. The study of the ranking makes it possible to identify groups of countries with a high, medium and low level of Europeanization of think tanks in all EU countries as of January 31, 2019. The results revealed on the basis of the analysis demonstrate the heterogeneous nature of the Europeanization process of think tanks in different EU countries.

Comparative Analysis of American NGOs in China and Chinese NGOs in the U.S.

This article analyzes the activities of American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China and Chinese NGOs in the United States in the context of global competition between the United States and China for the leadership in the future model of the world order. In International Relations theory, especially in its theoretical paradigm of realism, the consideration of states as actors in international relations dominates scholarship. However, in recent decades it has become apparent that researchers have a significant interest in non-state actors, such as interest groups and NGOs, and their impact on international relations. NGOs in China and the United States have different historical backgrounds, environments, and government institutions in different ways. Still, but in terms of comparative analysis they represent comparable categories. The analysis offered in this study shows that, firstly, despite the strict regulation of the activities of NGOs in place in China, American NGOs have more opportunities to work in this environment than Chinese NGOs do in the United States, where the situation for their activities is apparently more favorable. Secondly, despite the advantages that partnerships provide, neither American nor Chinese NGOs form partnership networks and therefore, lose momentum for their own development. Thirdly, although the conditions for their activities differ in both countries, American and Chinese NGOs have equal opportunities to pursue their goals. Finally, American NGOs in China are less dependent on their government than Chinese NGOs in the United States are on the Chinese government. The study is comparative and takes as its units of analysis Chinese NGOs in the United States and American NGOs in China. Developments in the field of interest group politics serve as the theoretical framework for this research. The investigation uses methods of comparative quantitative analysis and social network analysis, while the interdisciplinary nature of the methods allow them to take advantage of the analytical capabilities of Comparative Political Science, Interest Group Politics, and International Relations.

“Outside Lobbying” over the Airwaves: A Randomized Field Experiment on Televised Issue Ads

We present the first field experiment on how organized interest groups’ television ads affect issue opinions. We randomized 31,404 voters to three weeks of interest group ads about either immigration or transgender nondiscrimination. We then randomly assigned voters to receive ostensibly unrelated surveys either while the ads aired, one day after they stopped, or three days afterwards. Voters recalled the ads, but three ads had a minimal influence on public opinion, whereas a fourth’s effects decayed within one day. However, voters remembered a fact from one ad. Our results suggest issue ads can affect public opinion but that not every ad persuades and that persuasive effects decay. Despite the vast sums spent on television ads, our results are the first field experiment on their persuasive power on issues, shedding light on the mechanisms underpinning—and limits on—both televised persuasion and interest group influence.